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The purpose of this MBA professional report is to analyze the operational and 
maintenance requirements of Landing Craft Utility (LCU) vessels assigned to Assault 
Craft Unit One (ACU-1) in order to create a methodology in order to develop a 
requirements-based financial model.  This research report analyzes the number of LCUs 
required to perform assigned tasks based upon maintenance schedules, deployment cycles 
and training evolutions.  In addition, this research report compares expenditures made to 
the maintenance fund code, operating hours, and the number of craft deployed in order to 
explain past expenditures.  From this, a model was developed that takes into 
consideration the operational requirements of LCUs to forecast the resources needed to 
support the craft.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this project is to analyze the operational and maintenance 
requirements of Landing Craft Units (LCUs) in order to create a methodology for a 
requirements-based budget model for Assault Craft Unit ONE (ACU-1).  The authors use 
the requirements-based budget model to explain past expenditures and attempt to classify 
and match future requirements to required resources to ensure the optimal level of 
readiness of the affected units.  The model utilizes data obtained from the West Coast 
based units with the expectation that the model, with some adjustments, can be applied to 
the East Coast units. 
The authors placed particular emphasis on determining the current level of 
operational availability (Ao). Another area of focus was to develop a better understanding 
of the actual requirements placed upon ACU-1 and how Ao both impacts those 
requirements and how those requirements impact the overall Ao.  Finally, we examined 
funding levels and the impact that operations and other requirements have on the required 
funding level. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Special Combat Forces Pacific is a specialized organization tasked with 
supporting Naval Amphibious operations conducted by the United States Navy and the 
United States Marine Corps.  These forces on the west coast are organized under 
Commander, Naval Beach Group ONE (NBG-1) headquartered at Naval Amphibious 
Base (NAB), Coronado, California (U.S. Navy, 2008).  NBG-1 consists of four 
subordinate commands: Assault Craft Unit ONE, Beach Master Unit ONE, and 
Amphibious Construction Battalion ONE also located at NAB Coronado and Assault 




Historically, the Special Combat Forces Pacific has been funded on an ad hoc 
basis.  The Comptroller, Naval Surface Forces (SURFOR) has provided funds based on 
historical funding levels while offering extra funds based on availability.  SURFOR 
provided these funds without a robust understanding of what is required to support the 
LCUs.  Further, we have been unable to uncover any detailed documentation of ACU-1’s 
current requirements that can be used to communicate to the SURFOR Comptroller to 
assist in the budgetary process. 
While not an ideal situation, this process has provided the units of Special Combat 
Forces Pacific with sufficient resources to meet operational commitments.  The concern 
is that in the coming years the weakening economy and large ongoing expense of the 
Global War on Terror could result in a significant tightening of SURFOR’s resources, 
thereby affecting the funding levels of the Special Combat Forces.  With limited 
information as to what the required funding level is for the Special Combat Forces, the 
SURFOR Comptroller has initiated the development of a detailed budget model to 
provide for a more effective management of funds.  The budget documentation should 
provide justification to protect the necessary level of funds to support operations in the 
budgeting process and ensure that the requirements have been identified. 
C. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
ACU-1 is based at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado in San Diego, California.  
ACU-1 operates 12 LCUs and four Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM) based in San 
Diego with four additional LCUs forward deployed to Sasebo, Japan (U.S. Navy, 2008).  
LCUs were designed in the 1950s and built during the 1960s to support ship to shore 
movement of combat forces and other equipment in support of amphibious assault and 
relief operations (Saunders, 2008). 
ACU-1 organizes the craft into detachments of varying sizes of one, two, or three 
craft each.  These detachments deploy as part of a Navy Amphibious Ready Group 
(ARG).  An ARG is the Navy’s component used in support of a Marine Expeditionary 
Unit (MEU).  The centerpiece of an ARG is either an LHD (Landing Helicopter Dock) or 
and LHA (Landing Helicopter Assault) ship (U.S. Navy, 2007).  The number of LCUs 
 3
attached to either ARG is driven by a combination of factors.  One factor is the desire of 
the ARG Commander.  Another is the anticipated operations of the ARG while on 
deployment.  A final factor that drives the number of craft assigned to each detachment is 
the centerpiece ship of the ARG.  This ship, either an LHD or LHA, will impact the total 
number of LCUs that can deploy due to the differences in the configurations of the well 
decks.    An LHD will normally deploy with two LCUs, while an LHA, will normally 
deploy with three LCUs in the ARG.  However due to the total carrying capacity of the 
ships in the ARG the number of LCUs deployed with either ARG can be as many as five.  
The LHAs are in the process of being retired from service. Currently, there is only one 
operational LHA on the West Coast and three operational LHDs, with a new LHD 
scheduled to arrive on the West Coast later this year. 
The LCUs provide the heavy lift capability to the Marine Landing Force with the 
ability to carry a maximum load of 170 tons (U.S. Navy, 2007).  They are Diesel powered 
with a crew of 14, and are designed to conduct sustained operations at sea for up to 10 
days (U.S. Navy, 2007).  LCUs are similar to WWII-era landing craft with a bow ramp 
that is used for the disembarkation of units directly onto the beach.  LCUs are outfitted 
with four .50 caliber machine gun positions and are the only landing craft equipped to 
conduct opposed landings against hostile forces (U.S. Navy, 2007). 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The authors were unable to find any past research devoted to developing a 
requirements-based budget model.  However, there have been several attempts in prior 
studies to develop Operating Target (OPTAR) allocation models for fleet units.  These 
prior studies utilized regression analysis to determine if there was a link between OPTAR 
expenditures and operational schedules.  Prior studies were able to show a relationship 
between levels of expenditures and a level of operations, but none of those studies 
attempted to include a specific operational requirement component to their model. Mills, 
Warner, and Rush (2008) attempted to analyze OPTAR expenditures among Ticonderoga 
Class Cruisers to determine if differences in those expenditures could be traced back to 
specific fleet requirements or homeport locations.  Their research began by trying to 
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explain the reasons LANTFLT units experienced lower expenditures compared to 
PACFLT units.  What they found in their study was that neither a cruiser’s age nor its 
configuration reliably predicted SO (Consumables) and SR (Maintenance) expenditures 
(Mills, Warner, & Rush, 2008).  They did find that increased SX (Travel expenses) 
expenditures could be traced to a ship not being homeported in a fleet concentration area 
(Mills, Warner, & Rush, 2008). 
Rysavy (2007) performed a statistical analysis of OPTAR expenditures for 
PACFLT Los Angeles Class Submarines in order to determine if there were any 
statistically significant differences in expenditures between homeport locations.  Rysavy 
(2007) was able to show a relationship between OPTAR expenditures and ship schedules.  
This relationship was particularly strong for SR accounts, but weaknesses were noted in 
the relationship between SO accounts and ships schedules (Rysavy, 2007).  In his 
analysis, Rysavy did not attempt separate the expenditures by individual unit, but rather 
grouped all units located at a specific location together. 
Hascall et al. (2003) attempted to identify relationships between repair costs and 
level of operations.  Using regression analysis, they were able to show a strong 
relationship between SR expenditures and operational schedules.  This relationship 
allowed them to develop reliable predictions of past SR expenditures, but had little 
improvement in the ability to predict past SO expenditures (Hascall et al., 2003). 
Brandt (1999) attempted to develop a parametric cost model for estimating O&S 
costs for non-nuclear ships.  Using ship displacement, length, and manpower as 
independent variables Brandt, was able to develop a model that accurately estimated 
historic Operations and Support (O&S) costs (Brandt, 1999).  His model could be used by 
a specific CLASSRON as a way to determine total CLASSRON year-to-year funding, 
but is not applicable to individual units. 
Catalano (1988) developed an OPTAR allocation model that could be used to 
assist the COMNAVSURFPAC (now SURFOR) comptroller in the allocation of OPTAR 
grants to the fleet.  In his model critical events in a ships schedule were used to forecast 
requirements by quarter (Catalano, 1988).  This model proved reliable in being able to 
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explain past expenditures.  However, the model was only tested on two classes of ships 
and did not look at individual expenditures, instead the model, examined OPTAR total 
obligations without regard for fund code. 
Kuker and Hanson (1988) attempted to develop a forecasting model for the 
distribution of OPTAR grants to units of SURFPAC.  One of the weaknesses of their 
study was that age or equipment differences were not taken into account when they made 
their model (Kuker & Hanson, 1988).  Their model might be of use to a specific 
CLASSRON, but its relationship to an individual unit is not strong.  Kuker and Hanson 
(1988) did a good job of describing the budget formulation phase of afloat units.  They 
point out budgets begin with taking the prior year funding level then making adjustments 
to this to this amount based on expected increases or decreases in expected expenses. 
Williams (1987) performed an analysis of two classes of surface ships in the 
Pacific Fleet in an attempt to determine if relationships could be found between total 
OPTAR obligations and operational schedules.  Using parametric and non-parametric 
statistical methods in his analysis, he did not find any statistically significant relationship 
between monthly total OPTAR obligations and operational schedules.  There is no 
distinction made between SR and SO accounts in this study. 
E. READINESS AND MAINTENANCE 
The probability that a piece of equipment will be able to perform as it was 
designed in the actual operating environment can be described as readiness (Blanchard, 
1998).  Given this definition, readiness can be expressed as Operational Availability (Ao) 
(Blanchard, 1998).  There are several variants to the basic Ao model as shown below in 
equations 1.1 and 1.2, but for the purposes of this paper the focus is on the basic up 
time/total time model. 
Inherent Availability:  ( )0
MTBFA
MTBF Mct
= +       (1.1) 
Where MTBF is Mean Time Between Failure and Mct is Mean Corrective Maintenance 
Time (Blanchard, p.151, 1998) 
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Basic Formula:  ( )0
MTBM UptimeA
MTBM MDT TotalTime
= =+     (1.2) 
Where MTBM is Mean Time Between Maintenance and MDT is Mean Down Time 
(Blanchard, p.150, 1998) 
Both of these models show the impact that reliability and maintainability have on 
readiness.  In particular, reliability impacts MTBF and MTBM, while maintainability 
impacts Mct and MDT.  Increasing the time between maintenance or decreasing the time 
that it takes to perform the maintenance can have a dramatic impact upon the overall 
readiness level of any piece of equipment. 
    Third Generation: 
    • Higher plant availability and reliability 
  Second Generation: • Greater safety 
  • Higher plant availability • Better product quality  
First Generation: • Longer equipment life • Longer equipment life 
• Fix it when it 
broke 
• Lower costs • Greater cost effectiveness 
• No damage to the environment 
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Figure 1.   Growing Expectations of Maintenance (From: Moubray, 1997, p.3) 
When looking at the availability of LCUs, it is important to remember that these 
craft have been around for the past 40+ years.  Since the time that these units were built, 
the attitudes on readiness and maintenance have gone through a transformation.  When 
LCUs were designed, a transition was underway from the First Generation to the Second 
Generation way of thinking about maintenance (Moubray, 1997).  Figure 1 shows the 
differences between the first and second generation way of thinking about maintenance.  
First generation maintenance was to simply fix things as they broke with little or no 
analysis regarding what caused the equipment to break and the overall impact that this 
had on equipment availability (Moubray, 1997).  Second generation maintenance 
involved more analysis of why things broke and this resulted in longer equipment life, 
increased equipment availability and lower total costs (Moubray, 1997).  Figure 1 also 




Second Generation and the Third Generation.  The movement from the second to the 
third generation was the result of an increase in the use of improved management 
techniques (Mourbray, 1997). 
Logisticians and managers have recognized the life cycle cost savings that can be 
found by improving system readiness (Blanchard, 1998).  Because of this recognition 
money and effort has been spent in an effort to improve reliability, maintainability, and 
availability since the mid-1970s (Moubray, 1997).   While Mourbray’s depiction focuses 
on the changes that were occurring in industry, the same types of changes were occurring 
within the Department of Defense.  In particular, within the military there was a 
recognition that readiness determines the number of any weapon system required to meet 
mission requirements.  This recognition resulted in the realization that to improve 
readiness it is necessary to improve maintainability by reducing system down time or 
improve reliability by increasing the time between required maintenance (Blanchard, 
1998). 
F. IMPORTANCE OF BUDGETING 
1. Definitions of Budgeting 
There are multiple ways to define a budget, from what it does, to how it limits 
spending, to its affect on future planning.  The Navy defines a budget as: 
…a document that expresses in financial terms the plan for accomplishing 
an organization’s objectives for a specified period of time. It is an 
instrument of planning, performance measurement, decision-making, and 
management control, as well as a statement of priorities. Such a definition 
is descriptive of the Department of the Navy (DON) budget. (U.S. Navy, 
2005, pp. I-2) 
According to Aaron Wildavsky (1964),  
In the most literal sense a budget is a document, containing words and 
figures, which proposes expenditures for certain items and purposes... …a 
budget may be regarded as a contract… … concerned with the translation 
of financial resources into human purposes. (pp. 1-2) 
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In short, a budget is used to account for current spending, and to allot for future 
planning.  Budgets have been used in the federal government since the signing of the 
Constitution.  The Constitution states that Congress is “…to pay the Debts and provide 
for the common defense and general welfare of the United States…” (Constitution, pp. 
Art. I, Sect. 8) and is to provide such funds via “…Appropriations made by law…” 
(Constitution, pp. Art. I, Sect. 9).  In order to meet its duties of appropriations and 
payments, Congress then developed a budget to properly allocate this money, and provide 
for future planning (Jones & McCaffery, 2008).  These budgets tend to be incremental 
(Jones & McCaffery, 2008).  As Jones and McCaffery (2008) argued the previous year’s 
budget is used as the basis for next year’s budget. 
2. Budgeting in the Corporate World 
Budgeting in the corporate world does not necessarily follow the same 
incremental approach as it does in the public sector.  As noted by Dimmerling (1997), the 
corporate world begins the budgeting process by setting expectations for the upcoming 
year based upon key statistics or financial targets.  As part of the process, it is important 
to understand how any variable cost activity is budgeted.  The more accurate you can 
project your variable cost items the more accurate your budget will be (Dimmerling, 
1997). 
In 1995, Fleming wrote of the importance of budgeting.  She states that 
“budgeting is one of the important planning and control tools used by managers…” 
(Fleming, 1995, p. 1).  Fleming (1995) argues that every company should have a budget, 
regardless the size of the company.  As part of the budgeting process, it is important that 
the leadership of the company establish the primary goals of the firm.  In a for-profit 
company, the leadership must then develop a strategy to meet the goals that they have 
laid out for the company (Fleming, 1995).  For organizations like the U.S. Navy, strategy 
must not only fit the goal of the larger organization, DoD, but is determined by the 
national security strategy, and ultimately, the President.  In far too many cases, budgets 
are developed without taking into account the long-term consequences of how the budget 
will impact the ultimate goals of the company (Keogh, 2008).  Keogh (2008) points out 
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the importance of limiting the set of measures to determine the effectiveness of the 
budget.  Keogh (2008), suggests the use of rolling budgets as opposed to the traditional 
calendar year fixed budget.  This would require a change in the way the Navy, indeed the 
Government, prepares a budget. 
3. Government Budgeting 
In order to explain the budgeting process for ACU-1 and 1C6C, it is first 
important to understand the overall Federal budgeting process.  The modern budget has 
changed much since the first days of the Union, as has the size of the Federal 
government.  In addition to Appropriation bills that were first conceived of by the 
founding fathers, other documents are now required by law to successfully conduct 
government financial business year-to-year.  These include the Authorization bill, the 
President’s proposed budget, and other bills and documents.  The Authorization bill 
provides direction on how the money given to a department is to be spent, and provides 
the legal authority to do so.  The Appropriation bill actually directs the money to be 
distributed from the Treasury department to the various Federal agencies for spending 
purposes (Jones & McCaffery, 2008). 
The President is required to present a proposed budget to Congress by the first 
Monday in February each year  (U.S. Navy, 2005).  The Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) collects the budgets from the various departments within the government 
to provide data for the overall proposed Presidential budget.  It is the responsibility of the 
departments, such as the Department of Defense, to plan their budgets to provide for 
sufficient spending for the proposed Fiscal Year (FY), as well as budgeting for future 
plans and expenditures.  It is, therefore, incumbent upon the various components of the 
Navy to provide sufficient data and justification to ensure that their program receives the 
funds necessary for operation.  Failing to complete this important task could result in a 
program being unable to complete its designated mission due to lack of resources (Jones 
& McCaffery, 2008). 
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Regarding the formulation of a budget, it is not as simple as merely listing the 
items that require money, and asking for the requisite funds.  Careful consideration of 
both current and future requirements, as well as current and future funding levels must be 
taken into account when developing a budget submittal (Jones & McCaffery, 2008).  It is 
probably reasonable to assume that all organizations would like to see what they view as 
their requirements fully funded.  However, the reality is there are seldom sufficient funds 
available to cover every requirement.  Therefore, building a budget around the highest 
priority items first and providing funds for the long-term projects of the highest value 
help ensure that the organization will sustain what is most important (Jones & 
McCaffery, 2008). 
Another factor in the government budgeting process that must be considered is the 
type of funding that is requested and received (Jones & McCaffery, 2008).  Department 
of Defense (DoD) budgets have multiple streams of money, such as Procurement, 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E), and Operations and 
Maintenance (O&M) (Jones &McCaffery 2008).  These funding streams are often 
referred to as different “color[s] of money” (Heberling & Kinsella, 1998, p. 2), referring 
to the different places the money comes from and the specialized uses of the money.  For 
example, O&M money is used for day-to-day operations, and should not be used in new 
construction procurement, and likewise procurement money should not be used for 
personnel.  Due to these different funding streams, it is critical that any organization that 
exists within the Navy maintain different budgets for different items, depending upon the 
type of item discussed and what money must be used to pay for it. 
G. FUNDING ALLOCATION 
Funding is provided to NBG-1 via the 1C6C budget category.  In addition to these 
funds, NBG-1 has received Cost-of-War (COW) augments to fund expenses incurred in 
support of the Global War on Terrorism.  The 1C6C funds are allocated by the SURFOR 
Comptroller to each of the units that make up NBG-1, such as ACU-1, to cover day-to-
day operations in the form of an Operating Target (OPTAR) grant.  The OPTAR grant is 
accounted for through various fund codes such as SR (Maintenance) and SC 
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(Consumables).  Any increase to the initial OPTAR grant is received from either the 
SUFOR Comptroller in the form of budget augments or from COW augments.  The 
OPTAR grant is also used to fund intermediate level maintenance that takes the form of 
Continuous Maintenance Availabilities (CMAVs).  In addition, 1C6C funds pay for Dry-
docking Phased Maintenance Availabilities (DPMAs).  Generally, DPMAs are funded via 
the SURFOR Comptroller with the unallocated 1C6C money, which is sent directly to the 
Regional Maintenance Center (RMC).  The authors found in their research that in FY07 
and FY08 ACU-1 funded some DPMA expenses from their OPTAR grant and then the 
OPTAR was reimbursed via a COW augment. 
H. METHODOLOGY 
The method that the authors followed while conducting the research for this paper 
began with some basic assumptions.  First, we assumed that OPTAR repair costs have 
some relationship to operating hours.  Second, we assumed CMAV and DMPA costs 
remain fairly stable when taking into account inflation. 
Given these assumptions, the focus became identifying the information necessary 
to determine measures of readiness and requirements placed upon ACU-1.  U.S. Navy 
requirements documents were analyzed for assigned missions and estimated numbers of 
craft required for those missions.  Planned maintenance and training requirements were 
validated and added to arrive at a total craft requirement.  These figures were used in the 
determination of Ao. 
Next, operating hours were calculated based on internal documents used by ACU-
1.  Two separate sources for operating hours were considered and compared for accuracy, 
Operating hours as recorded on weekly Operating Summary (OPSUM) reports and Diesel 
Engine run hours.  Using operating hours as a base, it is possible to calculate the number 
of dollars per operating hour for a given level of readiness. 
Financial data for the previous four fiscal years were then analyzed. The data 




maintenance funds from the overall funding level.  The funds expended on maintenance 
were then compared to operating hours to identify any statistically significant correlation 
between the two values. 
As part of this analysis, interviews were conducted with maintenance and supply 
personnel to determine any funding shortfalls for the previous two years.  Interviews 
were also conducted with the Commanding Officer of ACU-1 to gain an understanding of 
his views of the funding level.  Interviews were also conducted with the Port Engineer 
and Operations Officer for ACU-1 to gain an understanding of the projections for the 
upcoming year. 
This methodology is consistent with the recommendations of Dimmerling (1997) 
who recommends that the budget process must first start with the projections for next 
year.  These projections take the form of changes in cost drivers and increases or 
decreases in the cost of items.  Also of importance is Koegh’s (2008) recommendation 
that you limit the number of items that you focus on to only those items that would 
account for the largest portion of total expenditures.  Based upon a combination of 
Dimmerling’s and Koegh’s guidelines, the focus of this project became the SR fund code 
and its relationship to craft operating hours. 
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II. DATA COLLECTION 
A. OVERVIEW 
Data collection for the project began with a site visit to NBG-1 headquarters in 
San Diego.  During the site visit, a command briefing was given by NBG-1’s 
Commanding Officer.  Members of this briefing included the Commanding Officers and 
selected staff members from each of NBG-1’s subordinate commands.  Because the 
scope of the project had yet to be defined, the authors were given an overview of each 
subordinate command’s respective missions, capabilities, and basic financial status.  
Upon completion of the briefing the authors sat down with each subordinate command 
leadership team individually to ask more detailed questions and tour their facilities and 
see much of the equipment and craft that they used. 
After receiving the general overview, the authors sat down with the project 
sponsor to evaluate the basic information that had been gathered and determine which 
command and platform offered the best opportunity to construct a requirements-based 
budget model.  Based upon this meeting and the information from the interviews, it was 
determined that the focus of the project should be on the LCU platform from ACU-1.  
Reasons for this decision included the size of the budget in relation to the other 
commands, the amount of information that was available, and the operations of the LCUs 
being the best understood by the authors. 
Once the subject of the project was determined, the authors had to make an initial 
assumption to limit the scope of the project.  The initial assumption that the authors made 
was that ACU-1’s costs are tied in some way to the number of hours ACU-1 operates its 
craft.  This assumption is tied to the wear and tear that occurs in machinery and 
equipment as it operates, so as operating hours increase, more money will be required to 
maintain and replace broken parts. Given this initial assumption, the next course of action 
was to identify data elements that would best represent the money spent on operations 
and the amount of LCU use. 
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Next, the authors scheduled a meeting with a contractor for ACU-5.  The 
contractor is a retired Naval Officer who has been involved with the LCAC program 
since its initial fielding (Tucker, 2009).  In the years since his retirement, his primary task 
for ACU-5 has been the development of a budget model.  The authors believed his 
experience would be a valuable guide for the development of the ACU-1 budget model.  
The discussions were limited to his methodology as it became apparent that the authors’ 
would not be able to replicate the amount and quality of data used in the ACU-5 budget 
model.  Utilizing the contractor’s methodology as a base, the authors began to identify 
data that would best approximate the information the contractor incorporated into the 
ACU-5 budget model. 
B. FINANCIAL DATA 
Financial data for ACU-1 were requested from SURFOR in the form of the 
Budget OPTAR Reports (BOR).  A BOR is a monthly report that is automatically 
generated by the supply inventory/budget management computer system during the end 
of month processing to present the current status of budgetary funds for a single line of 
accounting.  The BOR lists the current OPTAR grant, the amount of the grant that has 
been obligated, and the Fund Code used for the obligation. 
Fund Codes are a simple two-character code that serves as the Navy’s way of 
breaking down obligations into a number of general categories to facilitate management 
of the taxpayer’s money.  The first character is a letter or number that denotes the 
administrative chain of command of the unit.   The second character can also be a number 
or a letter and denotes the category of expenditure.  A full list of fund codes and who they 
are assigned to can be found in Appendix 30 of the Naval Supply Systems Command 
Publication 485 Volume 2. (1997, U.S. Navy) 
While there are many Fund Codes designated by the Navy, based on the authors’ 
experience the majority of expenditures are covered by only a few.  For ACU-1 the 
authors focused on SC and SR Fund Codes.  SR represents funds spent on repair of 
machinery and equipment that is supported by the Navy’s Coordinated Shipboard 
Allowance List (COSAL).  These are essentially repairs to the LCUs themselves and the 
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authorized equipment that the Navy has placed onboard.  The SC fund code represents 
what the Navy calls consumables, which for ACU-1 is the largest segment of its 
spending.  SC is essentially a catchall category, in that if another fund code does not 
directly apply to a purchase it will be made under SC.  SC includes a wide range of 
material anywhere from pencils to a commercial handheld GPS system.  While at first 
glance this Fund Code may not appear to be involved in the maintenance spending of 
ACU-1, it can also include contractor services for repairs and other outside/commercial 
maintenance support (U.S. Navy, 1997). 
Additional data were also collected from the ACU-1 Supply Officer’s personal 
record software.  Supply Officers have generated ad hoc programs in Microsoft Excel or 
Access to help them analyze and verify their expenditure numbers in ways that are not 
available with the provided management system, Microsnap.  ACU-1’s Supply Officer 
utilized an Excel program, configured to maintain manual logs that detail the information 
reported on the BOR, OPTAR grants and transfers, and other financial products.  This 
information was used to further the authors’ understanding of ACU-1’s financial data and 
to cross check the official records. 
Background data were obtained from a previous Naval Postgraduate School 
Thesis titled “A Feasibility Study of Relating Surface Ships OPTAR Patterns to Their 
Operating Schedules” (Kuker and Hanson, 1988).  This study was not conducted on 
LCUs specifically, but it contained a large amount of historical spending data by Fund 
Code.  These data were used to compare assumptions made about LCU spending to other 
Navy platforms and give a basis for their validity. 
The final piece of financial data was obtained from the ACU-1 Port Engineer.   
He provided the authors a list of DPMAs, including associated costs, conducted on LCUs 
from Fiscal Year 2003 until the present time, broken down by craft hull number.  He also 
provided a background number of CMAV costs. 
C. OPERATIONAL DATA 
To obtain the operating hours of the craft, a request was first made to the ACU-1 
Operations Officer.  Originally, an Excel spreadsheet was provided from his office listing 
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the operating hours from each craft.  However, after further discussions it was determined 
that the Operations Summary (OPSUM) reports on file would provide a more detailed 
account of LCU operations.  The OPSUM reports document the operations conducted 
each week and the hours spent underway locally as reported by the various craftmasters.  
The authors used the OPSUMs to determine the total number of local operating hours, the 
breakdown of the type of operations that the craft conducted in a given week, and the 
number of craft on deployment.  These data were consolidated into quarterly figures 
which allowed the authors to more closely align the data with the financial data.  The one 
key piece of data that was missing from the OPSUMs were the hours spent operating 
while on deployment. 
The authors indentified a separate measure from which to obtain operating hours.  
These data were gathered from records relevant to the LCU’s main propulsion systems, 
the Diesel engine inspection (DEI) reports.  The Navy maintains engine logs as a 
historical record of engine use and performance for the Navy’s maintenance and 
acquisition community.  These reports detail the number of hours in operation and are 
generally considered within the Navy to have high standards of accuracy.  We decided 
that these records would serve as a strong second check on the operational hours reported 
on the OPSUMs, and could potentially provide a measurement of the number of 
operating hours while on deployment.  Contact was made with the ACU-1 Diesel 
Inspector to obtain the required reports. 
In addition to establishing the cost vs. operating hour relationship, there was the 
need to establish the justification for the number of craft ACU-1 has.  The major source 
document for this section was the OPNAVINST 3501.93D “Required Operational 
Capabilities and Projected Operating Environment for Naval Beach Groups and their 
Elements” (ROC/POE), obtained from the Operations Officer for NBG-1.  The current 
form is a draft instruction that is in routing for approval, and while it is not an officially 
approved document at this time, the authors decided to use it as the baseline instruction 




documentation in the ROC/POE an interview was conducted with a member of NBG-1  
The staff member provided the authors with a generic Operations Plan requirement for 
LCUs for our analysis. 
D. PERSONAL INTERVIEWS 
In addition, the authors conducted interviews with members of the NBG-1 and 
ACU-1 staff to obtain background information into the operating environment and 
current challenges in operating the LCUs.  Information from these interviews may not 
have led to direct references but informed the opinions and direction of the authors during 
the project. The interviewees and the subject areas discussed are as follows: 
 
Position Subject 
Commanding Officer NBG-1 Commander’s Issues 
Commanding Officer ACU-1 Commanders Issue’s 
Operations Officer ACU-1 Craft Operations 
Division Officer ACU-1 Craft Operations/Training 
Supply Officer ACU-1 Budget/Spending 
Supply Officer (Relieving) ACU-1 Budget/Spending 
Training Officer ACU-1 Craft Training 
Operations Officer NBG-1 Craft Requirements 
Diesel Inspector ACU-1 Diesel Requirements 
Port Engineer Craft Maintenance 
NBG-1 Requirements Craft Requirements 
Model Developer ACU-5 Model Theory 
Table 1.   Interviewees and Subject Matter 
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III. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
1. OPLAN Analysis 
Assault Craft Unit ONE is currently assigned a total of 16 LCUs.  Four are 
designated to be forward deployed with the detachment WESTPAC located in Sasebo, 
Japan.  The other 12 craft are located in San Diego, with two permanently retired due to 
serious maintenance concerns.  Plans are currently in place to replace these craft with two 
LCUs transferred from the East Coast units (Lockwood, 2009). 
The current OPLAN requires nine LCUs from San Diego and four LCUs from 
detachment WESTPAC to be provided in the event of a major operation.  The OPLAN 
details the number required for a single operation in a single theater (Cervantes, 2009).  A 
limitation of the OPLAN number is that it does not reflect the need of any other theater 
operations that might be conducted simultaneously or services that are provided to other 
Department of Navy or Department of Defense commands.  Another limitation of this 
number is that it does not take into consideration current operational availability of the 
craft.  Training, maintenance, and other operational requirements will require a larger 
number of craft to be assigned to ACU-1 for them to maintain nine operational-ready 
craft. 
2. ROC/POE Analysis 
A more detailed breakdown of the requirements placed on ACU-1 is contained in 
the ROC/POE.  This instruction is issued by the Chief of Naval Operations through the 
Expeditionary Warfare Division with input provided by the Beach Groups and associated 
Teams.  The purpose of this instruction is to detail the types of missions that Naval Beach 
Group units are expected to undertake and the numbers of craft that are required to carry 
out the expected missions. 
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The ROC/POE directly addresses the day to day requirements for craft of ACU-1.  
As shown in Table 2, the breakdown of craft calls for 7 craft to be available from San 
Diego for deployment at any time.  This is based on ACU-1 being able to support one 
LHD (2 craft) deployment and one LHA (3-5 craft) deployment simultaneously (U.S. 
Navy, 2009).  As the current Tarawa class of LHAs are phased out of the fleet there is a 
certain amount of flexibility in this breakdown.  Only one LHA remains in the Pacific 
Area of Responsibility compared to three LHDs.  Based on interviews with the ACU-1 
Commanding Officer, most recent LHA deployments have been provided with the 
minimum of three LCUs per ARG, which if numbers hold, would allow ACU-1 to 
support four ARGs between the San Diego, and Sasebo based units (Lockwood, 2009).  
The authors attempted to validate the number of LCUs requested by each MEU, however 
no historical record of MEU requests was maintained. 
In addition to their own training requirements, ACU-1 must also support the 
training requirements of the units with which it operates.  The team is called upon to 
support the training of all the well deck equipped amphibious ships as well as Beach 
Master Units, and Marine units between deployment cycles plus various other fleet 
requirements when able.  The ROC/POE requires three craft to be available at all times to 
support these training requirements. 
The final two craft are available for maintenance.  The Joint Fleet Maintenance 
Manual (JFMM) requires that a craft undergo a Depot Maintenance period every four to 
five years (U.S. Navy, 2008).  Currently ACU-1 is funding dry-docking availabilities at 
the rate of two per year, each lasting roughly six months.  This drydock schedule 
accounts for one of the two craft designated for a maintenance status.  Furthermore, this 
schedule is sufficient to maintain ten operational West Coast LCUs.  However, once the 
two out of service craft are replaced there will need to be two additional dry dock periods 
scheduled in the five-year rotation to meet their obligations under the JFMM. 
The second craft dedicated to maintenance in the ROC/POE would be used to 
account for emergent repairs and Consolidated Maintenance Availabilities (CMAV).  
CMAVs are planned maintenance periods usually lasting two to three weeks when a craft 
is made available for more involved repairs and modifications that ACU-1 cannot or 
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should not attempt to schedule during the normal operational schedule.  The CMAV is 
coordinated with various repair activities and outside contractors to maximize the amount 
of work completed during these out of service times and are essential to maintaining the 
overall material condition of the craft. 
3. Ao  Analysis 
By following the ROC/POE force structure, a structural Ao can be derived.   An 
Ao figure of 83.3 percent is required for the craft based in San Diego to support the 
ROC/POE requirements.  For the craft based in Sasebo an Ao figure of 75 percent is 
required to support the ROC/POE requirements.  Table 2 consolidates both of these 
calculations.  One caveat that the current OPLAN numbers require four craft to be ready 
for deployment which would require a 100 percent craft availability at all times in order 
to meet that requirements.  That number is not practical at the current craft level. 
San Diego Sasebo





Required Ao 83.3% 75%
4-5 year DPMA cycle as required by JFMM  
Table 2.   Requirements Document Breakdown (After: U.S. Navy, 2009) 
Throughout the course of the authors’ research, it was possible to perform a 
validation of this Ao calculation. Table 3 shows the average number of craft in a given 
status over the three years of 2006 through 2008.  From this, an Ao calculation of 81.25 
percent was determined.  The authors were unable to calculate an actual Ao figure 
because craft status is currently tracked on a weekly vice daily basis. 
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Average values for 2006, 2007 & 2008







Available = In port + Deploy 11.38
Ao = Available / Total 81%
 
Table 3.   Ao Calculation Validation (After: ACU-1, 2006) (After: ACU-1, 2007) (After: 
ACU-1,2008) 
B. INITIAL DATA ANALYSIS 
The authors began their analysis by first examining the BOR reports, focusing on 
SR expenditures to simplify the data set.  As previously stated, the authors concentrated 
their analysis on the SR fund code, since these expenditures best represent funds spent on 
maintenance-related items.  The authors reviewed SB expenditures, but these 
expenditures represented less than 2 percent, on average, of the total expenditures 
between 2006 and 2008.  In the authors’ experience, other fund codes may contain some 
maintenance-related expenditures.  Due to time and scope limitations, the authors were 
unable to separate these maintenance-related expenditures within these other fund codes.  
For the aforementioned reasons, the authors focused on SR expenditures, and excluded 
all other fund code analysis from this project. 
Analysis of the initial data that was received indicated little statistical relationship 
between the maintenance dollars spent (SR) and the operating hours of the craft, as 
shown in Figure 2.  The linear regression model between hours and dollars produced a R2 
of 0.031, meaning that 97 percent of the variation was not explained with the data sets.  
Given the lack of any statistical significance in these data, additional information was 
obtained to further develop a model that could better represent a relationship between 
hours and expenditures.  The new data include, the in port operating hours of LCUs in 
San Diego, the number of craft in port, on deployment or in a maintenance period in San 
Diego or Sasebo.  The Diesel inspector provided figures for the total Diesel engine run 
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hours for the craft, further evidence of the actual usage of the craft.  The port engineer 
and supply officer provided DPMA cost amounts, CMAV estimates, and total OPTAR 
figures  The financial data were corrected for inflation using the inflation calculator 
available at the Naval Center for Cost Analysis website (U.S. Navy, 2009).  The data 
included information from 2003 through 2008, but were most complete in the years 2006 
through 2008.  The limited number of years of complete data became a limiting factor in 
the scope of this project. 
 
Figure 2.   Local Operating Hours vs. SR Expenditures (Appendix D, Table 12) 
The first information obtained from the new data was the breakdown of the total 
hours spent on various tasks by LCUs in San Diego, by week.  When totaled, there was a 
ten percent difference between the initial reported hours and the new data.  Both were 
supposed to represent the total in port operating hours.  The new data were obtained from 
the weekly source documents; therefore the decision was made to perform further 
analysis using the new data.  However, the initial simple linear regression model failed to 
provide appreciable improvements.  The authors then began to analyze the information, 
looking at such things as the number of craft in port or on deployment, as well as taking 
into consideration the total Diesel engine operating hours as an estimate of deployed 
operating hours. 
An analysis of the data representing the number of craft and their current usage is 
show in Figure 3.  The graph is a representation of the ten craft assigned to San Diego, 
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and their monthly utilization, on a percentage basis.  Noticeable in this graph is that in the 
first five quarters a larger percentage of craft, roughly a 60-40 split, were used for local 
operations vice deployed.  The next five quarters have more craft on deployment, with a 
roughly 30-70 split. 
 
Figure 3.   San Diego LCUs by Function (Appendix D, Table 25) 
C. LOCAL OPERATING HOUR ANALYSIS 
With an expectation that the hours of operation drove maintenance dollars, the 
authors decided to compare the OPSUM local hours to the SR maintenance dollars.  As 
shown in Figure 4 with a fit (i.e. R2) of 0.193, there is little direct relationship between 
SR maintenance dollars and local operating hours.  The level of the relationship could be 
explained because operations and repairs do not often occur simultaneously.  In the 
authors’ experience, it is far more common that higher operating tempos results in repairs 
occurring weeks or months after the fact.  As a result, Figure 5 shows a shifting of SR 




Figure 4.   Local Operating Hours vs. SR, by FY Quarters (Appendix D, Table 13) 
 
Figure 5.   Local Operating Hours vs. Left-Shifted SR, by FY Quarters (Appendix D, 
Table 14) 
However, shifting SR expenditures to the left did not result in a higher fit by itself 
(R2 of 0.194).  Noticeable is an inverse relationship in the period of higher local operating 
hours, as shown in Figure 6.  Figure 6 shows only the first five quarters depicted in 
Figure 5.  Performing a linear regression on this specified period resulted in the Local 
Operating Hours Model (LOHM), with a fit of 0.698.  This stronger association lends 





Figure 6.   Local Operating Hours vs. Left-Shifted SR, by FY Quarters, for the First Five 
Quarters of the Total Data Set (Appendix D, Table 15) 
D. DEPLOYED CRAFT ANALYSIS 
Next, the authors examined the relationship between deployment operations and 
SR expenditures.  Deployed operating hours are defined as those hours spent while the 
craft is attached to an ARG.  However, these hours are not currently tracked, and therefore 
were not available for analysis.  The OPSUMS do provide a historical record of the 
number of craft that were deployed, and while this measure may not perfectly map to the 
hours operated underway, it does provide an estimate where data were otherwise not 
available. 
 
Figure 7.   Deployed Craft vs. SR, by FY Quarters (Appendix D, Table 16) 
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Figure 7 is a representation of the number of craft deployed versus SR 
expenditures.  The authors performed a linear regression model and found a fit of 0.063.  
As with local operating hours, it is likely that maintenance dollars would be spent in the 
quarter following operations.  In the authors’ experience, this trend is far more likely in 
the case of the deployed craft, where most maintenance occurs after a deployment ends.  
Figure 8 depicts SR expenditure data again shifted to the left to account for this 
assumption.  While the fit does improve to 0.094, what is observed in the data is the five 
quarter period noted in Figure 9, representing a period of high deployment.  Performing a 
linear regression on this specific period resulted in the Deployed Craft Model (DCM), 
with a fit of 0.470. 
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Figure 9.   Deployed Craft vs. Left-shifted SR, by FY Quarters, for the Second Five 
Quarter Period of the Total Data Set (Appendix D, Table 18) 
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E. COMBINED SR EXPENDITURE PROJECTION DETERMINATION  
Upon completion of the Local Operating Hours Model (LOHM) and the 
Deployed Craft Model (DCM), the authors now had two models which explained some of 
the relationship between future quarterly SR expenditures and current quarter craft 
operations.  Understanding that each model contributes to the explanation of total SR 
expenditures differently, the authors devised a way to integrate the models into a 
Combined SR Expenditure Projection (CSREP).  This section describes this process. 
The first step in creating the CSREP was to establish common units between the 
different models.  The DCM does not have a direct hour translation, but does provide a 
SR dollar amount.  Since the LOHM also provides an SR dollar amount, this provides the 
common units for combining the models.  The LOHM and DCM are weighted by the 
proportion of the San Diego craft that were either in port or deployed.  Figure 10 shows 
the individual models arrayed against actual SR expenditure data.  The new projection, 
shown in Figure 11, has a correlation to the actual SR expenditures of 0.570 out of a 
possible value of -1 to +1. 
 




Figure 11.   CSREP vs. Actual SR Expenditure Data (Appendix D, Table 19) 
F. CONVERTING THE COMBINED SR EXPENDITURE PROJECTION TO 
A TOTAL QUARTERLY EXPENDITURE ESTIMATE 
1. Determining Conversion Factors 
In order to transform the CSREP to a Total Quarterly Expenditure Estimate 
(TQEE), two conversion factors needed to be developed.  The first conversion factor 
accounts for the craft stationed in Sasebo.  The OPSUM data did not provide local or 
deployed operating hours for the Sasebo-based craft.  The Diesel Engine Inspection 
(DEI) reports however, did include the Diesel engine hours of all craft, including those 
stationed in Sasebo.  These reports are compiled roughly every 18 months.  Since the 
reports cover different periods of time and since DEIs are staggered, an average was 
taken of the DEI data for both San Diego and Sasebo for comparison.  The average of the 
Diesel engine hours per month for the San Diego based craft is 28.0 hours per craft, 
versus an average of 19.8 hours per craft for the Sasebo-based craft.  The Sasebo-based 
craft account for, on average, 41.5 percent of the total Diesel engine hours over the DEI 
reporting periods, and the San Diego-based craft account for 58.5 percent.  To allow the 
authors to account for the Sasebo-based craft in the CSREP, it was necessary to divide 
the CSREP dollar figure by the percentage of the total Diesel engine hours that the San 
Diego-based craft represents.  This is represented by K3 in Figure 12, which in this case 
has a value of 0.585. 
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Having converted the CSREP to include Sasebo-based craft, the final step is to 
convert SR to total expenditures.  The difference between SR expenditures and total 
OPTAR expenditures is the remaining fund codes.  The conversion factor is based in part 
on research obtained from a thesis pertaining to surface ship OPTAR accounts (Kuker 
and Hanson, 1988) and based on the authors’ experience.  The conversion factor is the 
ratio between SR expenditures and total expenditures.  The ratio that the authors used is 
0.35, which corresponds to factor K4 found in the model in Figure 12.  The data 
supporting the K4 conversion factor can be found in Appendix E, Table 31. 
2. The Total Quarterly Expenditure Estimate 
To calculate the TQEE, multiply the CSREP by the conversion factor K3, and 
divide by the conversion factor K4, as shown in Figure 12.  This TQEE amount 
calculated represents an estimate of quarterly OPTAR expenditures based upon the 
number of San Diego craft deployed, number of San Diego craft in port, and the actual 
operating hours for San Diego craft.  These variables are all taken from the previous 
quarter’s data, to account for the time lag previously discussed between operations and 
maintenance expenditures. 
3. The Total Expenditure Estimate 
To arrive at a final Total Expenditure Estimate (TEE), it is necessary to calculate 
the TQEE for each quarter individually, and sum the four TQEEs.  After calculating TEE, 
the authors correlated total actual expenditures to TEE, and found a correlation of 0.597.  
Figure 13 shows a graphical representation of total actual expenditures and TEE 
relationship.  The final model, including the linear regression produced intercepts, slopes, 
and appropriate conversion factors already described, is included in Appendix D, 
Equation 1.3. 
To estimate the annual budget for ACU-1, it is necessary to add CMAV and 
DPMA expenses to the annual version of TEE.  However, not having the spending 
pattern of CMAV and DPMA related expenses, this final step was not included.  For 
ACU-1 to arrive at the total yearly estimate, it would be necessary to convert the TEE to 





Figure 12.   Simplified Total Quarterly Expenditure Estimate Equation (Appendix D, 
Equation 1.3) 
 




4. Accounting for the Differences Between the Model and Total 
Expenditures 
While the model does maintain a correlation of 0.597, there are surges in 
spending that the model is not able to explain.  Some of the differences may be the result 
of errors, which will be covered shortly, but there may be explanations provided by other 
sources as well.  One such source is the ACU-1 Financial Balance sheet and transfers in 
and out of the Total OPTAR account.  As shown in Table 4, FY 2007 had a fairly stable 
funding pattern over the first three quarters.  The fourth quarter grant increased more than 
$1.2 million.  We were not able to determine the reason the grant increased by such a 
large amount.  In turn, this affected the amount of money available for other 
expenditures. 
 FY 2007 Grant ($) COW Augment ($) Transfers ($) Expenditure ($) Balance ($)
1st quarter 220,000       210,481            9,519         
2nd quarter 300,000       287,078            22,441       
3rd quarter 378,000       1,101,000                1,115,000     341,678            44,763       
4th quarter 1,602,000    565,000        1,081,763         -             
Totals 2,500,000    1,101,000                1,680,000     1,921,000         -              
Table 4.   FY 2007 OPTAR Balance Sheet (After: Woodward, 2009) 
While the FY 2007 grants could be explained, in part, due to transfers, the FY 
2008 transfers do not fully explain the elevated totals noted.  The grants in FY 2008, as 
shown in Table 5, exceed nearly all past grants in FY 2007, and in most cases, exceeds 
the total of the first three quarters of FY 2007 combined.  We were unable to determine 
any specific reason that the grants increased by such a large amount.  We were able to 




 FY 2008 Grant ($) COW Augment ($) Transfers ($) Expenditure ($) Balance ($)
1st quarter 1,350,000   901,000        445,226            3,774         
2nd quarter 1,800,000   1,311,000     459,706            33,068       
3rd quarter 1,220,000   470,000        715,609            67,459       
4th quarter 1,823,500   3,961,000                4,372,165     1,407,137         72,657       
Totals 6,193,500   3,961,000                7,054,165     3,027,678         72,657        
Table 5.   FY 2008 OPTAR Balance Sheet (After: Woodward, 2009) 
G. PROBLEMS NOTED IN THE DATA SETS 
1. Financial Data 
There were no significant deficiencies noted in the financial data, but the lack of 
specificity or traceability of spending to separate hull numbers is an issue.  While it is 
possible to show spending and overall trends, the inability to trace funds obligated to 
hours operated and readiness achieved for one craft over another is a problem.  For this 
model to be fully effective, the ability to track all of this information, dollars, hours and 
readiness per craft is essential.  The alternative is a model that may be descriptive of 
overall trends, but may not show the cause and effect for each craft. 
When requested, ACU-1’s Port Engineer was able to provide specific data 
regarding the DPMAs, the data surrounding the CMAVs were less clear.  In the case 
where the model is attempting to describe all aspects of spending, including availabilities, 
and show the effect on readiness of the craft, it is important that the money spent on 
CMAV be tracked.  Relating these data, the spent funds, to the change in readiness may 
provide a more robust model, or at least provide an indication of the effectiveness of the 
money spent on CMAV in terms of the readiness achieved. 
2. Craft Operation Time 
There were a few problems noted with the data concerning the operating hours of 
the craft.  The problems with the data can be broken down into two areas:  1.) problems 
with the actual data itself and 2.) the absence of better data.  The OPSUM data had a 
variety of problems.  There were five occasions in 2008 where the OPSUM weekly 
reports reported that craft had completed tasks, but no hours were reported.  Sometimes 
 35
the list of tasks were quite extensive, and consistent with tasks completed in earlier 
weeks, but there was no annotation of hours spent.  In these cases, a reasonable consistent 
assumption, based on an analysis of data in the surrounding months was made for these 
missing hours. 
Accuracy was also found to be an issue.  Operational Hours reported were all 
rounded to the nearest full hour.  This rounding over time could result in a deviation from 
actual hours incurred.  Another problem with accuracy is one of miscalculation.  There 
were instances that the weekly total listed on the OPSUM did not correlate to the sum of 
the individual operations listed.  The choice was made by the authors to use the sum of 
the individual items, rather than the total listed.  Another accuracy problem was found 
with one of the completed tasks.  In this case, two craft were said to have completed in 
excess of 600 hours of work in one week.  Given that there are only 168 hours in a week, 
the two craft could have only completed, at most, 336 hours.  The decision, in this case, 
was to choose the 336, since the other number seemed unrealistic. 
While these data were not exact or accurate, the time periods the models were 
built in was on the scale of quarters, not weeks or months.  As a result, these inaccuracies 
should have been minimized by averaging, but the very action of averaging can hide 
trends and other facts.  That the TEE only accounts for 60 percent of the variability of the 
actual total expenditures is likely due in part to these problems. 
Finally, deployed operating hours are not tracked.  While attempts were made to 
estimate these hours in our models, having the actual data would provide a better 
indication of hours, and therefore remove any inaccuracies from the estimation. These 
hours were not noted on the OPSUMS, but could be calculated from either the deck logs 
of the craft, or the Diesel engine logs.  In the future, the lack of data could be mitigated 
by providing this information in the OPSUMS or, at a minimum, providing the 
information to the ACU by the Craftmasters for any hours operated while a craft was on 
deployment.  Either option would capture this information and would aid in future 
development of a predictive model. 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Craft Status Tracking  
Recommendation:  Track craft status on a daily basis during operations and 
consolidate into a single database. 
The principle limitation to the authors’ ability to derive a model that fully 
accounted for ACU-1 expenditures was the lack of accurate data.  To improve the quality 
of data, the authors recommend that ACU-1 begin long term tracking of LCU status in 
terms of full mission capable, partial mission capable, and non-mission capable on a daily 
basis.  Currently, craft status is reported weekly via the OPSUMs with no follow on 
analysis.  The authors argue the status should be reported daily to ensure the accounting 
of all craft downtime.  The current format leaves the possibility that if a craft is not 
functioning and is fixed during the reporting period and is not recorded; causing the 
calculated Ao to be overstated.  The daily data can then be analyzed to provide ACU-1 
with a more accurate metric to evaluate the material condition of their craft and the 
effectiveness of their maintenance efforts. 
2. Tracking Individual Craft Operating Hours 
Recommendation:  Track operational hours by craft to include deployed units. 
The authors further recommend that ACU-1 track operating hours while on 
deployment and that all operational hours be reported by individual craft.  The lack of 
detailed deployment operating hours caused the authors to rely on an estimate of 
deployed operating hours.  Further all operational hours, whether local of deployed, 
should be reported for the individual craft.  Currently craft are reported as a group, if two 
craft participate in an exercise the underway hours reported will reflect the exercise time 
and not necessarily the time each craft spent underway. 
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3. Tracking MEU LCU Requests 
Recommendation:  ACU-1 should keep a record of LCU requests by each 
deploying MEU to serve as a historic reference of requirements. 
The authors recommend ACU-1 track actual LCU requests made by the MEU 
planners prior to deployment.  ACU-1’s Commanding Officer made a comment that 
ACU-1 over the past few years has regularly been asked to provide more LCU’s than 
they were able to (Lockwood, 2009).  The authors attempted to verify this claim but were 
unable to, due to the informal nature of the request system.  Currently, the entire process 
is via E-mail sent through the NBG-1 operations officer with no official historical record 
kept.  The authors feel this is an important indicator of MEU requirements and should be 
kept by ACU-1 as an important record of actual demand for their craft. 
By tracking the above information in the manner recommended it will be possible 
for ACU-1 to accurately document their overall requirements for craft and underway 
hours and calculate a very accurate Ao.  This information when applied would greatly 
increase the ability of the model to accurately represent the true requirements of ACU-1. 
4. OPSUM Data 
Recommendation:  Increase emphasis on message accuracy. 
While analyzing the data that was reported via the OPSUM data numerous errors 
were noted by the authors.  It was understood prior to this project that great accuracy in 
the data was not necessary.  However, to use the data for predicting resource 
requirements, the data need to be more closely examined before being submitted.  Prior to 
submittal ACU-1 needs to verify that accurate data are on the message. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
This report is the first step in an ongoing process to develop a requirements-based 
budget model for ACU-1.  One goal of this project was to create a basic model and 




after the completion of the project.  A second goal of this project was to document the 
actual requirements that feed into the basic model so that future spending can be based 
upon a desired level of operational availability. 
In this project, the authors documented the number of LCUs required to support 
ACU-1’s operational commitments and the structural Ao of LCUs.  The actual Ao of the 
craft was not able to be determined due to the problems with the data as described in 
Chapter 3 section A.  Recommendations to correct these discrepancies are included in 
section A of this chapter and in Appendix A.  A relationship between local operating 
hours, the number of craft on deployment, and funds obligated in the SR fund code was 
found.  Based upon this relationship, the authors developed an estimator that is able to 
explain 60 percent of past expenditure variations. 
C. AREAS REQUIRING FURTHER STUDY 
In the course of conducting our research, the authors identified several areas that, 
if studied further, have the potential to better develop the financial model and further 
explain the requirements that drive the model. 
First, an analysis needs to be conducted of the spending and maintenance 
requirements that determine the total cost of DPMAs and CMAVs.  A review of the 
requirements was not completed due to a lack of engineering knowledge on the part of 
the authors.  Also, due to scope limitations, the authors did not perform an analysis of the 
items that have been included in past DPMAs or CMAVs.  The assumption was made 
that Commanding Officer, chief engineer, and port engineer made their decisions on the 
amount of work to perform during each DPMA and CMAV based upon work that needed 
to be completed and the amount of available funding. 
Second, an analysis should be conducted of spending under the SC fund code.  
After discussions with the ACU-1 staff, the authors believe that some maintenance costs 
are incurred under the SC fund code.  Due to the broad nature of spending that is included 
within the SC fund code and the limitations of the financial tracking system, it is not 
possible to separate maintenance spending from the rest of the category.  The authors 
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believe that the amount of maintenance spending completed under SC was not relatively 
large.  A more detailed analysis could allow this to be added into the existing 
calculations. 
Once ACU-1 has a more accurate record of craft status for a period of 18 to 24 
months, it will be possible to more closely tie operational availability to actual costs 
incurred.  For this project, we were only able to use the nominal Ao figure, but a more 
accurate Ao figure will allow for better decisions to be made in funding to support a 
required level of readiness. 
Finally, it is possible to use the same process that the authors described to perform 
similar analysis on the other units of NBG-1.  All of the units are funded by the same 
1C6C budget category for which the authors have only touched a small portion of the 
total budget.  Each subordinate command of NGB-1 should perform a similar study to aid 
in the preparation of the 1C6C budget. 
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APPENDIX A. TRACKING DOCUMENT 
Craft status is currently tracked weekly by ACU-1 through the OPSUMs.  While 
this method provides a history of craft status, the information contained was insufficient 
for this project.  The status was tracked weekly vice daily.  No definition was provided as 
to the different type of craft status.  There was not a breakdown of the craft’s ability to 
meet one type of mission requirement over another.  An example of this would be craft 
that was unavailable to be deployed due to mechanical failures, but could still meet local 
training missions, thereby contributing to the overall readiness of ACU-1.  This appendix 
includes various tables that could be utilized by ACU-1 as a means of tracking these 
statuses. 
Different factors were used for the basis of this spreadsheet; specifically, 
providing quantifiable descriptors of a crafts’ status.  The assumptions for the tables are 
shown here: 
1. All the missions that a craft (LCU) can be assigned to can be grouped into 
the following set of three: 
a. Training missions 
i. This includes qualification / proficiency for operators 
ii. Workups for a upcoming deployment 
b. Service requests (SERVALLs) 
i. Weapon movements 
ii. Training for other commands 
iii. Other miscellaneous assignments 
c. Deployments 
2. There is a maximum number of assigned craft to ACU – 1 of sixteen. 
3. The number of craft available for the day is assumed only to be those 
actually available for that day, not ones that could be available within a 
day or two.  For example, if a craft could be made available for a training 
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task that is coming up in two days, but is not available today, it would still 
be counted as down for training today, even though it could be rapidly 
restored, if necessary. 
The first table is presented with the simplest tracking mechanism for the craft.  
The minimum amount of information is tracked, showing only the ability for a craft to 
complete one of the three missions shown.  The intent of this table is for the individual 
Craftmasters assigned to the LCUs to make the daily determination of the crafts status, 
and communicate this information to the spreadsheet either directly, or through an 
appropriately designated point of contact within the ACU-1 staff.  An example of this 
sheet is shown below. 
 

















Table 6.   Simplified Tracking Document 
The next step in adding more detail to the tracking system involves adding 
sections involving the status of specific systems onboard each craft.  For the purposes of 
this appendix, the basic system requirements have been broken down into the following 
list.  It is assumed that combinations of up and down status for various components of 
this list would allow for a more detailed reporting of the craft status to the ACU staff, and 
provide a documented history of systems that are “down” most frequently.  This history 
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could be used to determine possible periodicity of system problems, and provide day-to-
day status of each craft.  The list of applicable systems follows here, and an example of 
this type of table is included afterwards: 
1. Watertight integrity 
a. This could also be defined as the ability for the ship to remain 
afloat within the capacity of its drain pumps. 
2. Craft navigability 
a. Defined as the ability of the craft to be driven from shore to the 
ship.  
b. An example of this would be functionality of the rudder. 
3. Power production capacity 
a. The ability for the craft to run its diesel to get the craft underway. 
4. Navigation equipment 
a. The equipment necessary to navigate the craft. 
b. Could include such equipment as: 
i. Radar 
ii. GPS 
iii. Running lights, and other Nav-aids 
c. While the first three requirements are mostly essential for 
underway operations, this requirement could be softened for some 
missions, e.g. it may not be necessary for a craft to have GPS or 
Radar, since it could follow other craft from the ship to the beach 
and return, without a degradation in mission capability. 
5. Ability to deploy men and material via the Ramp 
6. Ability for the craft to mate with and disengage from an LHD 
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Table 7.   Intermediate Table 
The next step in adding more detail to the tracking system involves adding a 
system to evaluate each tracked component and providing quantifiable status or readiness 
of each craft and of the squadron overall.  This would involve essentially the same table 
above, while making some of the assumptions, provided below, regarding the systems 
necessary for each craft to complete the various types of missions.  Also, using the 
descriptors provided for each mission, it could be possible for Excel to provide a simple 
numeric result of craft / ACU readiness each day, based on the requirements listed.  An 
example of a sheet with the appropriate filled in data and result for a typical day is shown 





d. Nav equip  
e. Servalls are generally service requests for the movement of men or 
material or other similar requests that are local in nature.  It may 
likely not be necessary that a craft link up with an LHD to 
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complete these or land on a beach, thus a craft could be mission-





d. Nav Equip 
e. Ramps (opt) 
f. ESG hookup (opt) 
g. Training status can be more ambiguous, since gaining driving 
proficiency for a Craftmaster may not require the ability to use the 
ramp, but completing workups for deployment would. 
3. ESG or Deployment operations 
a. Would require all systems to be operational 
b. Implies that a craft be fully operational and able to perform any 
mission presented to it within known requirements.  
Additional assumptions for the table: 
1. The availability is only determined by those craft not currently in CMAV or 
DPMA.  The craft in these availabilities do not count against the ACU for 
readiness.  However, this lower readiness number (including the craft in the 
availabilities) is provided for data purposes. 
2. For training purposes: 
a.  If a craft can meet the basic requirements of the Servall, but nothing 
more, it is considered to be at 50 percent. 
b. If a craft can also either work the Ramp or operate with an ESG, 75 
percent 
c. If a craft can perform all functions, 100 percent 
3. While the craft is in a maintenance period, it is considered down across the board, 
regardless of whether or not a particular system is functional on the craft in the 
drydock.  The condition of the craft would be tracked under the availability 
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reports, and is considered 100 percent down for purposes of this table, and its 
calculations. 
4. The total number of craft in the ACU is 16, as indicated in the upper – left corner.  
This number can be changed, but must be updated for the overall table to function 
correctly. 
5. Any craft that is in an availability is shaded out dependent upon the entry of a one 
in the DPMA / CMAV column of the appropriate craft. 
 














1602 100% 50% 0% 1 1 1 1 0 0
1610 100% 100% 100% 1 1 1 1 1 1
1611 100% 100% 100% 1 1 1 1 1 1
1615 100% 75% 0% 1 1 1 1 1 0
1624 100% 50% 0% 1 1 1 1 0 0
1628 0% 0% 0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 DPMA
1630 100% 100% 100% 1 1 1 1 1 1
1640 100% 75% 0% 1 1 1 1 0 1
1642 0% 0% 0% 1 1 0 1 1 1
1647 0% 0% 0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 CMAV
1652 100% 75% 0% 1 1 1 1 0 1
1663 100% 75% 0% 1 1 1 1 1 0
1667 0% 0% 0% 1 0 1 1 0 0
1671 0% 0% 0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 DPMA
1679 100% 75% 0% 1 1 1 1 1 0
1681 100% 75% 0% 1 1 1 1 1 0
3
85% 65% 23% Readiness with the applicable craft down for Availibility
70% 53% 19% Readiness with all craft assigned to the ACU  
Table 8.   Advanced Table 
 
 47
APPENDIX B. ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
A. OTHER UNITS IN NAVAL BEACH GROUP ONE (NBG – 1) 
1. Assault Craft Unit (ACU – 5)  
ACU-5 operates Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC) hovercrafts out of its base 
at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton located in North San Diego County, California.  
The LCAC is designed to deliver the assault elements of a Marine Ground Force from 
Naval amphibious ships lying offshore into the beach area at high speed.  Powered by 
four gas turbine engines, these craft can carry a payload of 60 – 75 tons over a distance of 
200 nautical miles at speeds in excess of 40 knots (U.S. Navy, 2007).  While not designed 
to conduct landings under fire, LCACs are outfitted with a number of small arms 
including .50 caliber machine guns and 40mm grenade launchers (U.S. Navy, 2007).  
More recently LCACs have been used to deliver relief supplies to disaster areas around 
the world. 
LCACs were first placed into service with the U.S. Navy in 1986.  Avondale 
Gulfport Marine and Textron Marine and Land Systems were given two separate 15 craft 
orders for initial production.  Upon delivery of the initial orders Textron Marine was 
awarded the contract for the remainder of production that has totaled 91 craft, the last one 
being delivered in 2001 (Saunders, 2008).  The Navy has initiated a Service Life 
Extension Program (SLEP), an overhaul program that returns the craft to the 
manufacturer where it is updated and rebuilt to allow the craft to operate for an additional 
ten years past the original service life.  Using the last craft delivered as a model (LCAC 
91), three craft have been returned to fleet service so far (U.S. Navy, 2007). 
LCACs operate from specially designed U.S. Navy amphibious ships equipped 
with an internal well deck.  These ships include Amphibious Assault Ships (LHA/LHD), 
Amphibious Transport Docks (LPD), and Dock Landing Ships (LSD).  These ships have 
the capability to operate alone or as part of an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG).  An 
ARG consists of an LHA/LHD, LPD and LSD.  A typical ARG will deploy with a 
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detachment of three to five LCACs, each with five crew members, maintenance 
personnel, and an Officer-in-Charge (OIC) under the ARG commander (U.S. Navy, 
2007). 
2. Beachmaster Unit ONE (BMU – 1) 
BMU-1 is located at Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, California.  Beachmaster 
Unit ONE is the Naval Element of the Landing Force Shore Party (LFSP).  The 
Beachmaster unit describes its mission as: 
The mission of BMU-1 is to support the landing movement over the 
beaches of troops, equipment and supplies, and to facilitate the evacuation 
of casualties and prisoners of war.  In addition, the Beachmasters maintain 
communications and liaison with designated naval commanders and naval 
control units, control all craft and amphibious vehicles in the vicinity of 
the beach from the surf line to the high water mark, coordinate the 
reembarkation of equipment, troops and supplies, determine and advise on 
the suitability for landing through coordination with the Oceanographic 
Section of the Sea, Air, Land (SEAL TEAM), control craft salvage, keep 
appropriate Navy commanders apprised of wind and surf conditions, 
install causeway beaching range markers lights, and assist in the defense 
of the beach. (Beachmaster-1, 2008) 
3. Amphibious Construction Battalion (ACB – 1)  
Based out of Naval Amphibious Base Coronado, California, ACB-1 is the support 
element of the Naval Construction Force, better known as the SeaBees, for amphibious 
operations in the Pacific Fleet.  These SeaBees are trained to build facilities in support of 
the operations on shore with no established infrastructure.  They are trained in 
construction disciplines such as steelwork, electrical, and equipment operations as well as 
ground combat skills.  Their Motto, “We Build, We Fight,” is a testament to their ability 
to operate in hostile environments where they need to provide their own security and in 
some cases fight as infantrymen. 
SeaBees can build camp facilities to support up to 1,200 personnel, Roll-on/Roll-
off discharge facilities, Causeway Bridge Ferry Transport Systems, Amphibious Assault 
Bulk Fuel/Water Systems and Offshore Discharge Systems, and over 300 pieces of Civil 
Engineering Support Equipment (CESE) (ACB TWO, 2008).  Outside of their main 
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responsibilities, SeaBees have gained a reputation for being able to handle many 
problems outside of their general responsibilities and are often counted on to build or fix 
any structure to help support the missions of the forces they are attached to.  A valuable 
fixture to any amphibious operation the SeaBees have also become a fixture of relief 
operations around the world. 
B. MAKEUP OF ARG 
An Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) is a Navy flotilla of ships specifically 
designed for the transport and support of Marine Corps forces trained to conduct 
amphibious landings on foreign shores (U.S. Navy 2007).  The ARG generally consists of 
three ships, each of a different ship type, which embarks the Marine Expeditionary Unit 
(MEU) for a roughly six month deployment to the Pacific or Mediterranean. 
The centerpiece of the ARG is the LHD/LHA.  These are aircraft capable ships 
that look similar to World War II era Aircraft Carriers (U.S. Navy 2007).  The Marines 
Air Combat Element (ACE) is a combined squadron of 28 aircraft that embarks the 
LHD/LHA to offer aviation support to the MEU (U.S. Navy 2007).  The squadron 
consists of different aircraft types to support the various requirements of the MEU.  A 
typical squadron consists of 12 CH-46D Sea Knight helicopters for troop/supply 
missions, six AV-8B Harrier II’s for close in ground support, four CH-53E Super Stallion 
helicopters for troop/supply support, four AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters for 
close in ground support, and two UH-1W Iroquois command and control helicopters 
(U.S. Navy 2007).  The LHD/LHA also contains a vehicle storage area and berthing for a 
number of Marine equipped with an internal well-deck to embark various landing craft 
and serves as the command ship for the ARG and MEU commanders (U.S. Navy 2007). 
In addition to the LHD/LHA are one each of an LPD and an LSD (U.S. Navy 
2007).  While each has a slightly different configuration, both are designed to carry 
Marines and landing craft.  An LPD can carry two LCACs or a single LCU while most 
LSDs, specifically designed to carry LCACs, can carry as many as four (U.S. Navy 
2007). 
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APPENDIX C. AN ALTERNATIVE DETERMINATION OF 
DEPLOYED OPERATING HOURS 
The authors were able to create an alternate estimate of the number of deployed 
operating hours after obtaining the DEI reports.  DEI reports were used because they 
provide an accurate measure of the number of hours the main propulsion Diesel engines 
operate over a given period of time.  DEI reports can cover a period of time which is 
based upon when the DEI actually occurs.  DEIs occur on a roughly 18 month cycle, but 
can vary by up to two months based on historical data.  Subtracting the OPSUMs local 
operating hours from the total Diesel engine hours provides an estimate of the operating 
hours completed on deployment.  Dividing these estimated hours by craft on deployment 
provides an estimate of the average operating hours, by craft on deployment. 
Since it was not possible to determine individual craft deployed hours via the DEI 
reports, the authors performed an analysis to determine the average monthly Diesel 
engine operating hours.  This was done be summing the total hours reported on all the 
Diesel inspections received, and dividing by the total months for all the same reports.  
The result is an average of 28.0 hours per craft per month.  This represents the total hours 
operated, on average, by a single craft per month.  Multiplying the result by 8.25, the 
average number of craft operating throughout 2006–2008, and by 36 months, results in an 
estimate of the total hours operated by all craft during this period.  Removing the hours 
for local operations and dividing by the average deployed craft during the same period, 
and adjusting the total to a monthly basis, results in an average deployed craft operating 
hours of 12.25 hours / month.  This calculation is shown in Table 10.  Using the average 
deployed operating hours by craft per month, it was possible then to apply this average 
amount to the actual craft deployed on a monthly basis over the years of 2006 – 2008.  
The result is shown in Figure 14, with the Total operating hours depicted by the black 
dash-dotted line.  The linear regression model is plotted against actual SR expenditures in 
Figure 15, with a correlation of 0.429. 
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Table 9.   Diesel Engine Inspection reports, San Diego (Appendix E, Table 32) 
 
  CRAFT DATE PORT MPDE STBD MPDE Min MPDE months
LCU 1646 MAY 2006-APR 2009 811 807 807 55
LCU 1627 JUN 2005-JUL 2008 868 848 848 38
LCU 1634 AUG2004-MAR 2009 1990 2002 1990 56
LCU 1651 AUG 2004-MAR 2009 424 792 424 56  
Table 10.   Diesel Engine Inspection reports, Sasebo (Appendix E, Table 32) 
 
Total Diesel Operating hours 11,099    Hours
Total Diesel Operating months / 397         Months
Average Diesel Operating hours by month 28.0        Hours / Month
Average Operating craft 8.25        Craft
36 months x 36           Months
Diesel hours 2006 - 2008 8,299      Hours
Local Operating hours 2006 - 2008 - 6,353      Hours
Deployed Diesel hours 2006 - 2008 1,947      Hours
Average Deploying craft 4.41        Craft
36 months / 36 Months
Average Deploying craft hours by month 12.25      Hours / Craft / Month  
Table 11.   Summation of Deployed Hours Calculation by Means of Diesel Engine Inspection 
Reports (Appendix E, Table 32) 
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Figure 14.   Total Operating Hours, Based on Deployed Hours via Diesel Inspection 










Figure 15.   Diesel Engine Inspection Report Derived Total Hour SR Expenditure Model 
vs. Actual SR Expenditure data (Appendix D, Table 24) 
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APPENDIX D. PROCESSED DATA TABLES 
Date OPSUM (hours) SR ($)
Jan-06 63 14,179  
Feb-06 72.5 34,057  
Mar-06 142 25,308  
Apr-06 176.5 35,747    
May-06 201.5 20,345    
Jun-06 194.5 30,908    
Jul-06 97 25,205    
Aug-06 662 22,145  
Sep-06 227 11,260  
Oct-06 80 38,961  
Nov-06 71 13,627  
Dec-06 98.5 782       
Jan-07 231 40,297  
Feb-07 246 48,255  
Mar-07 216 32,194  
Apr-07 144 24,228  
May-07 86 14,821  
Jun-07 438 17,391  
Jul-07 67 14,393  
Aug-07 647 10,256  
Sep-07 191 9,619      
Oct-07 226 49,623    
Nov-07 214 80,711  
Dec-07 91 38,951  
Jan-08 374 32,806  
Feb-08 122 23,030  
Mar-08 214 16,367    
Apr-08 78 14,784  
May-08 41 49,939  
Jun-08 46 34,368  
Jul-08 44 177,558
Aug-08 74 10,430  
Sep-08 114 (9,491)   
Oct-08 118 23,546  
Nov-08 202 51,997  
Dec-08 43 90,132   
Table 12.   Original Local Operating Hours and SR Expenditure Data (Appendix D, Table 
25, Appendix E, Table 27) 
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FY year Quarter OPSUMS (hours) SR ($)
2006 2 278                       73,544    
3 573                       87,001    
4 986                       58,610    
2007 1 250                       53,370    
2 693                       120,746  
3 668                       56,439    
4 905                       34,268    
2008 1 531                       169,285  
2 710                       72,203    
3 165                       99,091    
4 232                       178,497  
2009 1 363                       165,675   
Table 13.   Local Operating Hours and SR Expenditure Data (Appendix D, Table 21 and 
Appendix D, Table 22) 
FY year Quarter OPSUMS (hours) SR Shift Left ($)
2006 2 278                        87,001
3 573                        58,610
4 986                        53,370
2007 1 250                        120,746
2 693                        56,439
3 668                        34,268
4 905                        169,285
2008 1 531                        72,203
2 710                        99,091
3 165                        178,497
4 232                        165,675
2009 1 363                         
Table 14.   Local Operating Hours and SR Expenditure Data Shifted Left (Appendix D, Table 
21 and Appendix D, Table 22) 
 FY year Quarter OPSUMS (hours) SR Shift Left ($)
2006 2 278 87,001
3 573 58,610
4 986 53,370








2009 1  
Table 15.   Local Operating Hours and SR Expenditure Data Shifted Left, First Five Quarters 
Only (Appendix D, Table 21 and Appendix D, Table 22) 
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 FY year Quarter Deployed craft SR ($)
2006 2 6.5 73,544     
3 4.0 87,001     
4 3.5 58,610     








2009 1 3.9 165,675     
Table 16.   Deployed Craft and SR Expenditure Data (Appendix D, Table 21 and Appendix 






 FY year Quarter Deployed craft SR Shift Left ($)
2006 2 6.5                          87,001                  
3 4.0                          58,610                  
4 3.5                          53,370                  








2009 1 3.9                           
Table 17.   Deployed Craft and SR Expenditure Data Shifted Left (Appendix D, Table 21 and 
Appendix D, Table 22) 
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2009 1  
Table 18.   Deployed Craft and SR Expenditure Data Shifted Left, First Five Quarters Only 
(Appendix D, Table 21 and Appendix D, Table 22) 
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FY year Quarter OPSUMS (hours) Local Operating Hour Model ($) In port fraction In port SR ($)
2006 2 278                        0.31                  
3 573                        97,075                    0.54                  30,068             
4 986                        73,914                    0.61                  40,165             
2007 1 250                       41,449                  0.79                25,296             
2 693                       99,274                  0.73                77,974             
3 668                       64,453                  0.39                47,339             
4 905                       66,416                  0.19                25,829             
2008 1 531                       47,809                  0.47                9,155               
2 710                       77,172                  0.48                35,984             
3 165                       63,119                  0.09                30,471             
4 232                       105,908                0.55                9,724               
2009 1 363                       100,648                0.43                54,899             
Intercept 118,863                Fit - LOHM 69.8%
Slope (78.51)                   Fit - DCM 47.0%
FY year Quarter Deployed craft Deployed Craft Model ($) Deploy fraction Deploy SR ($)
2006 2 6.5                        0.69                
3 4.0                         137,609                  0.46                  94,987             
4 3.5                         63,222                    0.39                  28,867             
2007 1 1.9                        48,143                  0.21                18,762             
2 2.1                        (610)                      0.27                (131)                 
3 5.5                        3,913                    0.61                1,039               
4 6.3                        107,452                0.81                65,665             
2008 1 4.6                         132,583                  0.53                  107,195           
2 4.0                        80,814                  0.52                43,132             
3 7.6                        62,217                  0.91                32,181             
4 3.0                        170,279                0.45                154,645           
2009 1 3.9                        32,060                  0.57                14,573             
Intercept (58,411)                 Fit - CSREP 57.0%






2006 2 73,544                  
3 125,054                 87,001                  
4 69,032                   58,610                    
2007 1 44,058                   53,370                  
2 77,843                   120,746                
3 48,378                   56,439                    
4 91,494                   34,268                    
2008 1 116,350                 169,285                  
2 79,116                   72,203                    
3 62,652                   99,091                  
4 164,369                 178,497                  
2009 1 69,471                   165,675                   
Table 19.   CSREP (Weighted LOHM and DCM) vs. SR Expenditures (Appendix D, Table 













2006 2 240,164             
3 125,054          215,611                    616,032            255,418             
4 69,032            119,021                    340,059            341,477             
2007 1 44,058            75,962                      217,035            224,667             
2 77,843            134,213                    383,465            298,388             
3 48,378            83,411                      238,318            355,140             
4 91,494            157,748                  450,708          1,124,385          
2008 1 116,350          200,603                    573,151            462,767             
2 79,116            136,406                    389,733            466,602             
3 62,652            108,021                    308,631            726,344             
4 164,369          283,395                    809,699            1,428,244          
2009 1 69,471            119,778                    342,223            360,138             
Conversion Factor for Sasebo 1.72 Fit 59.7%
Conversion Factor for SR -> Total expenditures 35%  
Table 20.   Derivation of TQEE; TQEE vs. Actual Expenditure data (Appendix D, Table 21 























2006 2 68,900   228,888 224,999    73,544      244,315    240,164     
3 81,507   66,286   239,289    87,001      70,753      255,418     
4 54,909   124,156 319,915    58,610      132,524    341,477     
2007 1 50,000   73,005   210,481    53,370      77,926      224,667     
2 116,169 92,875   287,078    120,746     96,534      298,388     
3 54,300   116,673 341,678    56,439      121,270    355,140     
4 32,969   438,759 1,081,763 34,268      456,047    1,124,385  
2008 1 162,868 161,380 445,226    169,285     167,738    462,767     
2 71,136   282,617 459,706    72,203      286,857    466,602     
3 97,627   485,843 715,609    99,091      493,131    726,344     
4 175,859 701,380 1,407,137 178,497     711,900    1,428,244  
2009 1 163,227 377,320 354,816    165,675     382,980    360,138      
Table 21.   Quarterly Original OPTAR expenditure Data and Converted Values for Inflation 
(Appendix E, Table 27) 
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In port DEI CMAV DPMA Deploy
2006 2 101     93          2.9      0.2 0.0 0.4       6.5        
3 183     191        4.8      0.0 0.3 0.9       4.0        
4 328     329        5.5      0.0 0.3 0.7       3.5        
2007 1 106     83          7.0      0.1 0.0 1.0       1.9        
2 226     231        5.7      0.0 1.2 1.0       2.1        
3 331     223        3.5      0.0 0.0 1.0       5.5        
4 334     302        1.5      0.0 0.9 1.3       6.3        
2008 1 198     177        4.0      0.3 0.2 0.9       4.6        
2 199     237        3.7      0.3 1.0 1.0       4.0        
3 85       55          0.8      0.7 0.3 0.8       7.6        
4 141     77          3.6      0.6 1.5 1.3       3.0        
2009 1 128     121        2.9      0.0 1.3 1.9       3.9         
Table 22.   Quarterly San Diego Craft Allotments, Original and Updated Local Operating 
Hours (Appendix D, Table 25) 
 
   Fiscal 
Year 
 Quarter In port DEI CMAV DPMA Deploy
2006 2 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2
3 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.3
4 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0
2007 1 2.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 1.3
2 2.9 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.7
3 3.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
4 3.8 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
2008 1 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0
2 3.0 0.0 0.8 0.2 0.0
3 2.8 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0
4 1.0 0.5 0.4 1.8 0.3
2009 1 0.7 0.8 1.5 1.0  
Table 23.   Quarterly Sasebo Craft Allotments (Appendix D, Table 26) 
 62
 FY year Quarter Deployed craft OPSUMS (hours) Deploy (hours) Total Hours
2006 2 6.5 278                      79.7 357             
3 4.0 573                      49.4 622             
4 3.5 986                      43.3 1,029           
2007 1 1.9 250                      23.5 273             
2 2.1 693                      25.3 718             
3 5.5 668                      67.4 735             
4 6.3 905                      77.6 983             
2008 1 4.6 531                      56.6 588             
2 4.0 710                      49.0 759             
3 7.6 165                      92.9 258             
4 3.0 232                      36.8 269             
2009 1 3.9 363                      47.4 410             
Average Diesel hours / month / craft 12.25
FY year Quarter Total MODEL ($) SR ($)
2006 2 73,544                  
3 118,299              87,001                  
4 97,801                58,610                  
2007 1 66,264                53,370                  
2 124,815              120,746                
3 90,339                56,439                  
4 89,017                34,268                  
2008 1 69,879                169,285                
2 100,461              72,203                  
3 87,188                99,091                  
4 125,981              178,497                
2009 1 125,142              165,675                
145,949              
(77.42)                
Intercept
Slope  
Table 24.   Total Hours Determination Based on DEI Reports vs. SR Expenditure Data 
(Appendix D, Table 21 and Appendix D, Table 22) 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
118,863 _ _ * 78.51 * _ _
_ _ _ * 0.35
1*
0.35 * 1 0.42
58,411 _ * 30,157 * _
_ _ _ * 0.35
_
In port hours In port craft
craft deployed In port craft
craft deployed craft deployed
craft deployed In port craft
Yearly










In port DEI CMAV DPMA Deploy
Jan-06 76           63 1 0.5 0 1 7.5
Feb-06 84           72.5 1.75 0 0 0.25 8
Mar-06 143          142 6 0 0 0 4
Apr-06 175          176.5 5 0 0.75 0.75 3.5
May-06 210          201.5 5 0 0 1 4
Jun-06 166          194.5 4.4 0 0 1 4.6
Jul-06 97           97 4 0 0 1 5
Aug-06 808          662 5 0 0 1 4
Sep-06 80           227 7.6 0 0.8 0 1.6
Oct-06 87           80 7.25 0 0 1 1.75
Nov-06 177          71 7 0 0 1 2
Dec-06 54           98.5 6.8 0.2 0 1 2
Jan-07 225          231 5.75 0 1.25 1 2
Feb-07 236          246 5 0 2 1 2
Mar-07 216          216 6.4 0 0.4 1 2.2
Apr-07 156          144 6 0 0 1 3
May-07 409          86 3.5 0 0 1 5.5
Jun-07 428          438 1 0 0 1 8
Jul-07 67           67 1.25 0 2 1.75 5
Aug-07 749          647 2 0 0 1 7
Sep-07 187          191 1.25 0 0.75 1 7
Oct-07 246          226 3 0 0.5 1 5.5
Nov-07 256          214 4.6 0 0 0.8 4.6
Dec-07 91           91 4.5 0.75 0 1 3.75
Jan-08 311          374 5.25 0 0.75 1 3
Feb-08 146          122 3.2 0.8 2 1 3
Mar-08 140          214 2.75 0 0.25 1 6
Apr-08 126          78 0.5 1 0.75 1 6.75
May-08 58           41 0.8 0.2 0 1 8
Jun-08 71           46 1 0.75 0 0.25 8
Jul-08 210          44 4.5 0.75 0.75 1 3
Aug-08 102          74 3.8 1 1.2 1 3
Sep-08 112          114 2.5 0 2.5 2 3
Oct-08 164          118 1.4 0 2 2 4.6
Nov-08 144          202 1.75 0 1.25 2 5
Dec-08 75           43 5.5 0 0.75 1.75 2  
Table 25.   San Diego Craft Allotments, Original and Updated Local Operating Hours (After: 
ACU-1, 2006) (After: ACU-1, 2007) (After: ACU-1, 2008) 
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  In port DEI CMAV DPMA Deploy
Jan-06 3.5 0 0 0 0.5
Feb-06 2.25 0 0 0 1.75
Mar-06 2.8 0 0 0 1.2
Apr-06 2.5 0 0 0 1.5
May-06 2 0 0 0.5 1.5
Jun-06 3 0 0 0.2 0.8
Jul-06 3.75 0 0 0.25 0
Aug-06 3 0 0 1 0
Sep-06 3 0 0 1 0
Oct-06 2 0 0 0 2
Nov-06 2 0 0 0 2
Dec-06 2 2 0 0 0
Jan-07 3.25 0.75 0 0 0
Feb-07 3.5 0 0 0 0.5
Mar-07 2 0.4 0 0 1.6
Apr-07 3 0 0 0 1
May-07 4 0 0 0 0
Jun-07 4 0 0 0 0
Jul-07 4 0 0 0 0
Aug-07 3.4 0.6 0 0 0
Sep-07 4 0 0 0 0
Oct-07 3 0 0 1 0
Nov-07 3 0 0 0.4 0
Dec-07 3 0 0 1 0
Jan-08 3 0 0.5 0.5 0
Feb-08 3 0 1 0 0
Mar-08 3 0 1 0 0
Apr-08 4 0 0 0 0
May-08 2.4 0 0 1.6 0
Jun-08 2 0 0 2 0
Jul-08 0.5 1 0.5 2 0
Aug-08 1.6 0.4 0 2 0
Sep-08 1 0 0.75 1.5 0.75
Oct-08 0 0 1 2 1
Nov-08 0 0 1 2 1
Dec-08 2 0 0.5 0.5 1  
Table 26.   Sasebo Craft Allotments (After: ACU-1, 2006) (After: ACU-1, 2007) (After: 
ACU-1, 2008) 
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APPENDIX E. RAW DATA TABLES 
 



















Jan-06 13,284  149,923 52,269   1.0674  14,179   160,028  55,792     
Feb-06 31,906  49,052  107,461 1.0674  34,057   52,358    114,704    
Mar-06 23,710  29,912  65,270   1.0674  25,308   31,928    69,669     
Apr-06 33,490  22,118  99,690   1.0674  35,747   23,608    106,410    
May-06 19,060  11,956  64,312   1.0674  20,345   12,762    68,647     
Jun-06 28,957  32,212  75,287   1.0674  30,908   34,383    80,361     
Jul-06 23,614  15,148  67,063   1.0674  25,205   16,169    71,583     
Aug-06 20,746  73,113  217,032 1.0674  22,145   78,041    231,660    
Sep-06 10,549  35,895  35,820   1.0674  11,260   38,315    38,234     
Oct-06 36,501  29,349  128,188 1.0674  38,961   31,327    136,828    
Nov-06 12,767  24,161  60,371   1.0674  13,627   25,790    64,440     
Dec-06 733       19,495  21,921   1.0674  782       20,808    23,399     
Jan-07 38,769  46,775  126,587 1.0394  40,297   48,618    131,575    
Feb-07 46,426  28,464  99,062   1.0394  48,255   29,586    102,965    
Mar-07 30,973  17,636  61,429   1.0394  32,194   18,331    63,849     
Apr-07 23,310  44,336  102,437 1.0394  24,228   46,083    106,473    
May-07 14,259  25,268  81,586   1.0394  14,821   26,263    84,801     
Jun-07 16,731  47,070  157,655 1.0394  17,391   48,924    163,866    
Jul-07 13,848  14,247  137,073 1.0394  14,393   14,809    142,474    
Aug-07 9,867    226,494 514,351 1.0394  10,256   235,417  534,617    
Sep-07 9,254    198,019 430,339 1.0394  9,619     205,821  447,294    
Oct-07 47,742  33,815  122,140 1.0394  49,623   35,148    126,952    
Nov-07 77,652  81,917  196,360 1.0394  80,711   85,144    204,097    
Dec-07 37,474  45,648  126,726 1.0394  38,951   47,446    131,719    
Jan-08 32,321  71,071  114,674 1.0150  32,806   72,137    116,395    
Feb-08 22,690  100,835 160,747 1.0150  23,030   102,348  163,158    
Mar-08 16,125  110,711 184,284 1.0150  16,367   112,372  187,049    
Apr-08 14,566  65,918  164,095 1.0150  14,784   66,907    166,556    
May-08 49,201  392,139 466,449 1.0150  49,939   398,022  473,446    
Jun-08 33,860  27,786  85,065   1.0150  34,368   28,203    86,341     
Jul-08 174,934 308,043 578,716 1.0150  177,558 312,664  587,397    
Aug-08 10,276  304,291 473,314 1.0150  10,430   308,856  480,414    
Sep-08 (9,351)   89,045  355,107 1.0150  (9,491)    90,381    360,433    
Oct-08 23,198  68,961  127,965 1.0150  23,546   69,995    129,884    
Nov-08 51,229  130,346 134,376 1.0150  51,997   132,301  136,392    
Dec-08 88,800  178,013 92,475   1.0150  90,132   180,683  93,862      
Table 27.   Original OPTAR Expenditure Data and Converted Values for Inflation (After: 
1C6C, 2006) (After: 1C6C, 2007) (After: 1C6C, 2008) 
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6 13 20 27 3 10 17 24 3 10 17 24 31 7 14 21 28
Workups 0 28 0 6 5 9 7 5 0 0 3 7 8.5 58 84 11 8
Training 0 0 6 0 13 0 2 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
Servalls 0 4 14 5 0 15 5 12 48 32 22 17 0 0 0 6 2
Totals 0 32 20 11 18 24 14 17 48 37 25 24 8.5 58 84 17 18
In port 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 7 7 7 7 7 6 3 4
DEI 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CMAV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
DPMA 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Deploy 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4
In port 4 4 4 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 2 2 4
DEI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DPMA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CMAV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deploy 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 0
5 12 19 26 2 9 16 23 30 7 14 21 28 4 11 18 25
Workups 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 74 0 0 14 246 96 11
Training 0 0 3 25 6 5 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 8 0 0
Servalls 110 14 0 50 16 8 0 35 115 0 0 14 4 10 38 31 208
Totals 110 14 3 75 22 13 10 35 115 5 74 14 4 24 292 127 219
In port 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5
DEI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CMAV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DPMA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Deploy 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4
In port 4 2 1 1 1 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3
DEI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DPMA 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
CMAV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deploy 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 8 15 22 29 6 13 20 27 3 10 17 24 1 8 15 22 29
Workups 0 30 0 1.5 1.5 9 3 7 0 0 0 7.5 7.5 45 0 0 0 0
Training 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 24 6 6 0 5.5 5.5 6 16 4 7 4
Servalls 148 0 25 7.5 7.5 23 0 0 8 16 23 0 0 0 8 9 0 0
Totals 148 36 25 9 9 32 3 31 14 22 23 13 13 51 24 13 7 4
In port 6 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6
DEI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
CMAV 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DPMA 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Deploy 4 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
In port 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
DEI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
DPMA 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CMAV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deploy 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0









September October November December
 
Table 28.   Raw OPSUM 2006 Data (After: ACU-1, 2006) 
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5 12 18 26 2 9 16 23 2 9 16 23 30 6 13 20 27
Workups 0 8 48 102 0 11 0 0 8 4 83 7 43 8 18 19 38
Training 8 4 18 4 8 8 6 4 10 15 0 5 7 0 0 12 0
Servalls 0 28 6 5 24 35 137 13 4 10 0 5 15 0 19 23 7
Totals 8 40 72 111 32 54 143 17 22 29 83 17 65 8 37 54 45
In port 7 6 6 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 7 7 6 6 6 6 6
DEI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CMAV 0 1 1 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DPMA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Deploy 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3
In port 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 4 4
DEI 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CMAV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DPMA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deploy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0
4 11 18 25 1 8 17 22 29 6 13 20 27 3 10 17 24 31
Workups 0 0 13 3 48 0 0 3 264 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 3 0
Training 4 0 6 0 0 10 26 64 0 4 1 7 8 4 0 0 0 8
Servalls 11 17 13 19 7 5 0 11 0 6 0 11 30 34 58 336 178 21
Totals 15 17 32 22 55 15 26 78 264 10 1 18 38 38 63 336 181 29
In port 6 6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
DEI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CMAV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
DPMA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Deploy 3 3 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 5 5 5 5 7 7 7 7 7
In port 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4
DEI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
CMAV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DPMA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deploy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 14 21 28 5 12 18 26 2 9 16 23 30 7 14 21 28
Workups 31 0 0 17 0 8 0 0 30 7 60 0 0 0 0 0 0
Training 0 14 12 0 14 0 0 0 0 13 0 20 0 0 18 15 0
Servalls 96 8 0 13 8 12 134 50 0 0 48 0 36 58 0 0 0
Totals 127 22 12 30 22 20 134 50 30 20 108 20 36 58 18 15 0
In port 2 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 6
DEI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
CMAV 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DPMA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
Deploy 7 7 7 7 7 7 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 3
In port 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
DEI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CMAV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DPMA 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Deploy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
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4 11 17 25 1 8 15 22 29 7 14 21 28 4 11 18 25
Workups 0 0 296 0 6 0 2 0 4 12 16 0 4 20 10 16 0
Training 0 10 2 66 6 7 5 21 8 8 0 0 0 0 8 16 0
Servalls 0 0 0 0 6 32 21 16 48 8 40 30 36 0 0 8 0
Totals 0 10 298 66 18 39 28 37 60 28 56 30 40 20 18 40 0
Inport 6 6 6 3 3 2 3 4 4 3 3 3 2 1 1 0 0
DEI 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
CMAV 0 0 0 3 3 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
DPMA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Deploy 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 8
Inport 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4
DEI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CMAV 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
DPMA 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deploy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 9 18 23 30 6 13 20 27 4 11 18 25 1 8 15 22 29
Workups 12 0 10 0 0 0 12 0 0 8 0 6 6 5 5 0 6 0
Training 4 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 0 0 7 0 0
Servalls 4 0 8 3 0 0 27 0 0 0 0 6 6 13 13 0 13 12
Totals 20 0 18 3 7 0 39 0 0 8 0 18 18 18 18 7 19 12
Inport 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4
DEI 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0
CMAV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
DPMA 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Deploy 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Inport 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 1 0 2 2 2 2
DEI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
CMAV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
DPMA 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Deploy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 12 19 26 3 10 17 24 31 7 14 21 28 5 12 19 26
Workups 0 3 6 54 46 0 0 0 0 16 6 0 0 15 0 0 0
Training 0 18 6 2 6 8 5 8 10 10 6 16 0 3 0 10 0
Servalls 10 5 6 4 12 22 5 6 36 0 6 42 54 15 0 0 0
Totals 10 26 18 60 64 30 10 14 46 26 18 58 54 33 0 10 0
Inport 2 2 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 5 5 6 6
DEI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CMAV 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
DPMA 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
Deploy 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2
Inport 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 3
DEI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CMAV 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
DPMA 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0
Deploy 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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1629 09/08 through 02/09 $2,360,842.00 
1665 06/08 through 11/08 $2,030,383.00 
1617 12/07 through 06/08 $2,500,00.00 
1633 07/07 through 11/07 $1,951,286.00 
1666 03/07 through 08/07 $2,196,401.00 
1630 09/06 through 02/07 $1,987,100.00 
1648 03/06 through 08/06 $1,835,457.00 
1632 08/05 through 12/05 $1,273,380.00 
1665 12/04 through 02/05 $1,117,736.00 
1629 08/04 through 10/04 $1,147,013.00 
1633 09/03 through 10/03 $1,148,970.00 
1617 06/03 through 08/03 $1,340,930.00 
1646 02/03 through 03/03 $362,168.00 
1630 01/03 through 01/03 $276,304.00 
1632 10/02 through 11/02 $140,672.00 
Table 31.   DPMA Cost and Schedule Data From 2003 – 2008 (From: James, 2009) 
CRAFT DATE PORT MPDE STBD MPDE Min MPDE months
LCU 1617 OCT 2005-MAY 2008 993 1044 993 32
LCU 1629 DEC 2004-APR 2008 865 864 864 41
LCU 1630 JUL 2005-SEP 2008 1051 1034 1034 39
LCU 1632 APR 2005-JAN 2008 559 574 559 34
LCU 1633 JUN 2005 MAR 2008 1384 1212 1212 34
LCU 1635 NOV 2004-AUG 2008 1824 1671 1671 46
LCU 1648 SEP 2005-NOV 2008 1117 1126 1117 39
LCU 1665 APR 2005-JUN2008 1206 1198 1198 39
LCU 1666 NOV 2004-APR 2009 1525 1512 1512 54
LCU 1630 MAY 2005-JUL 2008 939 982 939 39
LCU 1646 MAY 2006-APR 2009 811 807 807 55
LCU 1627 JUN 2005-JUL 2008 868 848 848 38
LCU 1634 AUG2004-MAR 2009 1990 2002 1990 56
LCU 1651 AUG 2004-MAR 2009 424 792 424 56  




 Month SR TOTAL Month SR TOTAL Month SR TOTAL Month SR TOTAL
USS JOUETT (CG 29) USS HORNE (CG 30)
FY 1985 FY 1986 FY 1985 FY 1986
OCT 172,799 635,207 OCT 158,132 294,071 OCT 144,892 381,150 OCT 132,795 293,947 
NOV 46,360   205,966 NOV 94,278   176,695 NOV 78,620 204,059 NOV 74,149   172,001 
DEC 43,122   141,042 DEC 35,714   97,869 DEC 93,300 199,006 DEC 12,590   105,971 
JAN 61,897   188,985 JAN 115,202 288,632 JAN 152,203 446,316 JAN 65,271   201,863 
FEB 63,581   143,965 FEB 86,543   251,573 FEB 92,415 153,189 FEB 103,032 173,705 
MAR 50,357   97,518   MAR 48,004   153,578 MAR 91,837 206,289 MAR 81,273   210,894 
APR 86,318   220,356 APR 154,689 380,957 APR 111,689 573,330 APR 59,778   173,195 
MAY 76,721   196,997 MAY 61,147   186,469 MAY 107,140 280,936 MAY 28,452   131,760 
JUN 54,321   130,373 JUN 106,953 228,121 JUN 170,762 459,570 JUN 56,156   182,204 
JUL 129,469 247,702 JUL 96,161   263,917 JUL 87,817 235,687 JUL 31,869   306,718 
AUG 69,645   315,067 AUG 109,495 225,361 AUG 146,055 529,562 AUG 34,989   151,404 
SEP 79,153   157,488 SEP (9,864)    (3,218)  SEP 167,127 335,409 SEP 136,594 493,212 
USS STERETT (CG 31) USS W H STANDLEY (CG 32)
FY 1985 FY 1985 FY 1986
OCT -        261,946 OCT 51,761   263,388 OCT 148,318 299,887 OCT 129,612 374,005 
NOV 131,898 314,984 NOV 36,840   187,640 NOV 67,135 188,422 NOV 75,002   207,046 
DEC 95,945   197,611 DEC 100,497 592,043 DEC 34,933 72,121 DEC 59,461   117,822 
JAN 84,620   294,861 JAN 80,363   695,809 JAN 45,087 158,017 JAN 28,364   103,004 
FEB 99,134   287,695 FEB 45,692   196,897 FEB 67,743 207,320 FEB 53,360   289,215 
MAR 93,773   302,704 MAR 88,321   234,055 MAR 39,281 195,131 MAR 88,546   236,935 
APR 47,227   201,758 APR 81,321   212,930 APR 72,725 216,431 APR 84,582   318,923 
MAY 90,538   326,042 MAY 47,689   148,735 MAY 38,590 187,742 MAY 68,034   217,772 
JUN 97,702   279,380 JUN 67,323   349,212 JUN 76,303 155,387 JUN 28,783   130,341 
JUL 63,625   284,605 JUL 32,097   62,856 JUL 140,977 302,254 JUL 107,865 255,790 
AUG 97,146   301,984 AUG 58,900   194,319 AUG 83,966 571,096 AUG 69,655   182,819 
SEP 45,470   145,791 SEP 91,666   317,079 SEP 114,800 193,306 SEP 40,935   176,660 
USS FOX (CG 33) USS KNOX (FF 1052)
FY 1985 FY 1985 FY 1986
OCT 107,300 242,202 OCT 87,001   190,631 OCT 31,931 92,281 OCT 22,232   140,907 
NOV 88,499   221,047 NOV 78,475   247,724 NOV 42,380 98,277 NOV 67,579   134,357 
DEC 49,170   180,182 DEC 76,951   130,806 DEC 14,548 40,099 DEC 33,890   61,787   
JAN 149,021 432,617 JAN 44,379   227,292 JAN 36,712 93,926 JAN 33,248   76,433   
FEB 144,523 319,770 FEB 69,343   155,811 FEB 28,537 114,557 FEB 19,057   59,896   
MAR 130,657 188,652 MAR 1,983     29,919 MAR 27,173 94,257 MAR 50,617   134,235 
APR 98,448   240,110 APR 38,939   86,687 APR 25,386 220,904 APR 37,239   80,794   
MAY 87,196   314,187 MAY 49,863   160,667 MAY 43,369 111,203 MAY 10,594   58,249   
JUN 91,873   264,109 JUN 92,590   203,886 JUN 132,896 (2,092)  JUN 510        33,437   
JUL 128,146 310,267 JUL 23,989   131,190 JUL 33,847 119,695 JUL 32,259   110,471 
AUG 86,544   228,027 AUG 31,098   107,135 AUG -       AUG 38,869   136,669 
SEP 81,005   166,854 SEP 215,648 551,379 SEP -       SEP 16,505   83,549   
USS WHIPPLE (FF 1062) USS LOCKWOOD (FF 1064)
FY 1985 FY 1986 FY 1985 FY 1986
OCT 112,676 198,285 OCT 66,754   142,965 OCT 45,976 113,502 OCT 61,442   201,853 
NOV 21,763   45,863   NOV 34,264   77,787 NOV 57,305 80,237 NOV 17,610   52,879   
DEC 81,564   380,630 DEC 35,138   45,857 DEC 35,005 71,301 DEC 9,542     29,442   
JAN 21,251   89,327   JAN 89,390   156,230 JAN 53,389 151,934 JAN 4,079     45,313   
FEB 16,087   67,260   FEB 45,097   100,768 FEB 46,810 192,923 FEB 28,810   62,645   
MAR 20,168   59,652   MAR 12,888   32,086 MAR 22,860 55,251 MAR 33,547   76,666   
APR 27,791   92,309   APR 24,008   93,819 APR 57,919 152,582 APR 25,683   75,477   
MAY 26,141   67,540   MAY 33,405   89,822 MAY 13,056 72,593 MAY 22,849   69,331   
JUN 29,004   85,690   JUN 22,812   75,434 JUN 9,265   48,065 JUN 18,644   41,299   
JUL 26,415   74,396   JUL 65,219   123,820 JUL 18,405 58,348 JUL 10,890   61,268   
AUG 39,602   102,503 AUG 29,567   75,370 AUG 30,424 89,563 AUG 11,378   68,006   




 Month SR TOTAL Month SR TOTAL Month SR TOTAL Month SR TOTAL
USS STEIN (FF 1065) USS F HAMMOND (FF 1067)
FY 1985 FY 1986 FY 1985 FY 1986
OCT 42,427   121,057 OCT 33,930   136,730 OCT 70,319 158,793 OCT 15,699    76,024    
NOV 30,707   105,610 NOV 40,861   59,565  NOV 13,919 113,480 NOV 14,315    46,355    
DEC 13,761   22,974   DEC 21,807   51,978  DEC 35,624 70,180 DEC 18,371    30,644    
JAN 58,135   150,870 JAN 41,255   75,255  JAN 17,001 47,392 JAN 41,361    144,502  
FEB 23,958   87,369   FEB 58,740   144,925 FEB 22,786 60,831 FEB 36,975    60,858    
MAR 65,807   117,780 MAR 31,339   25,381  MAR 64,043 137,888 MAR 15,323    97,050    
APR 30,242   100,911 APR 37,797   60,804  APR 23,142 61,993 APR 11,439    56,247    
MAY 13,616   81,421   MAY 47,780   90,667  MAY 20,442 61,614 MAY 14,105    103,304  
JUN 24,694   67,176   JUN 14,978   42,147  JUN 29,460 70,669 JUN 33,316    71,909    
JUL 5,403     137,302 JUL 27,385   104,743 JUL 24,358 225,793 JUL 33,676    120,968  
AUG 52,314   56,480   AUG 43,745   116,307 AUG 40,124 150,787 AUG 31,457    72,382    
SEP 69,227   164,159 SEP 39,106   131,319 SEP 96,139 232,663 SEP 57,373    123,570  
USS DOWNES (FF 1070) USS BADGER (FF 1071)
FY 1985 FY 1986 FY 1985 FY 1986
OCT 93,445   197,697 OCT 38,574   98,422  OCT 65,664 147,538 OCT 53,825    114,426  
NOV 33,049   73,171   NOV 49,085   91,276  NOV 73,085 90,164 NOV 23,730    74,746    
DEC 54,872   132,785 DEC 54,949   99,849  DEC 27,785 35,748 DEC 11,996    31,607    
JAN 70,461   118,012 JAN 54,380   139,153 JAN 78,163 131,778 JAN 70,438    102,209  
FEB 25,156   97,193   FEB 37,100   56,792  FEB 45,903 88,910 FEB 27,640    117,158  
MAR 34,902   75,380   MAR 15,130   20,509  MAR 34,813 100,560 MAR 42,859    90,647    
APR 45,657   118,939 APR 85,968   132,805 APR 66,833 152,834 APR 21,789    61,014    
MAY 10,585   46,591   MAY 7,079     36,486  MAY 34,929 77,990 MAY 57,616    91,793    
JUN 24,701   59,346   JUN (2,943)    (146,997) JUN 85,960 120,921 JUN 42,587    95,165    
JUL 53,269   137,165 JUL 121,300 164,750 JUL 32,834 102,149 JUL 17,950    68,217    
AUG 1,880     54,603   AUG 36,574   89,230  AUG 67,107 97,791 AUG 46,380    97,064    
SEP 20,829   103,638 SEP 60,058   112,882 SEP 19,822 37,369 SEP 16,932    37,281    
USS FANNING (FF 1076) USS COOK (FF 1083)
FY 1985 FY 1986 FY 1985 FY 1986
OCT 53,604   89,587   OCT 55,334   121,529 OCT 17,196 68,150 OCT 39,593    57,928    
NOV 38,166   110,265 NOV 33,236   72,845  NOV 22,182 79,817 NOV 60,315    110,767  
DEC 43,416   74,051   DEC 20,950   37,799  DEC 29,119 71,790 DEC 12,949    24,800    
JAN 67,064   159,480 JAN 39,320   89,675  JAN 43,655 102,453 JAN 27,160    57,945    
FEB 50,274   129,255 FEB 38,666   93,795  FEB 22,350 38,802 FEB 36,795    65,674    
MAR 40,773   75,720   MAR 24,629   47,785  MAR 33,923 64,888 MAR 15,079    57,993    
APR 52,010   139,946 APR 65,494   151,720 APR 55,760 150,972 APR 21,859    89,286    
MAY 21,294   66,614   MAY 21,182   83,081  MAY 42,684 147,574 MAY 18,709    33,306    
JUN 30,060   72,630   JUN 22,539   49,044  JUN 49,795 97,266 JUN 194,582  684,032  
JUL 57,009   125,260 JUL 12,512   69,736  JUL 22,764 93,078 JUL (176,149) (629,043) 
AUG 22,945   38,385   AUG 27,737   78,883  AUG 79,438 175,226 AUG 76,725    152,433  
SEP 19,803   43,854   SEP 12,255   60,671  SEP 60,419 115,299 SEP 43,017    154,435  
USS KIRK (FF 1087)
FY 1985 FY 1986
OCT 10,933   47,853   OCT 15,589   65,412  
NOV 23,218   52,851   NOV 38,828   94,013  
DEC 31,759   113,387 DEC 6,983     111,133
JAN 38,048   92,471   JAN 25,932   202,052
FEB 37,853   76,871   FEB 30,612   84,678  
MAR 31,308   72,966   MAR 17,090   52,055  
APR 24,875   89,596   APR 13,663   63,619  
MAY 22,686   71,229   MAY 14,222   50,410  
JUN 31,194   86,914   JUN 20,079   92,107  
JUL 14,348   84,210   JUL 30,632   73,744  
AUG 33,401   147,505 AUG 12,634   45,114  
SEP 13,647   146,625 SEP 31,500   48,146  
SR Total
18,214,947  50,857,735       
29,168,989       9,797,248    
Average 35.8%





Table 33.   Historical FF and CG SR vs. Total expenditure data (After: Kuker, 1988) 
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